Constitutional Law And Sovereignty

Is this correct Critics maintain that the judiciary’s qualification of sovereignty “jeopardizes democratic legitimacy.” According to Richard Ekins, sovereignty is an integral part of representative democracy that guarantees final legislative power remains with elected legislators rather than appointed judges. As to Ekins and H.W.R. Wade, a judicial re-definition of sovereignty would represent a “constitutional revolution”whereby the constitution becomes a “judges’ constitution,” reducing parliamentary accountability. Ekins, within Steyn’s “judges’ model” of sovereignty, ultimate power is transferred from elected legislators to unelected judges, thus compromising democratic accountability. This remains a fundamental issue that must be addressed within the framework of common law constitutionalism.

Is this correct yes or no Critics maintain that the judiciary’s qualification of sovereignty “jeopardizes democratic legitimacy.” According to Richard Ekins, sovereignty is an integral part of representative democracy that guarantees final legislative power remains with elected legislators rather than appointed judges. As to Ekins and H.W.R. Wade, a judicial re-definition of sovereignty would represent a “constitutional revolution”whereby the constitution becomes a “judges’ constitution,” reducing parliamentary accountability. Ekins, within Steyn’s “judges’ model” of sovereignty, ultimate power is transferred from elected legislators to unelected judges, thus compromising democratic accountability. This remains a fundamental issue that must be addressed within the framework of common law constitutionalism.

Is this correct yes or no This trend is best exemplified in the Miller litigation, in which the Supreme Court asserted its role in protecting constitutional fundamentals by requiring parliamentary authorization for an EU withdrawal, striking down an illegal prorogation in order to uphold accountability. Paul Craig finds in these rulings proof that constitutional fundamentals circumscribe the effective exercise of sovereignty, in which courts play an interpreter’s role in relation to constitutional coherence. In turn, Nick Barber finds sovereignty to persist in so far as it remains compatible with other constitutional values. In conclusion, sovereignty and the rule of law constitute two interdependent columns; it is sovereignty that confers democratic credentials to the rule of law, while sovereignty derives its own legitimation from the rule of law.

Is this true This trend is best exemplified in the Miller litigation, in which the Supreme Court asserted its role in protecting constitutional fundamentals by requiring parliamentary authorization for an EU withdrawal, striking down an illegal prorogation in order to uphold accountability. Paul Craig finds in these rulings proof that constitutional fundamentals circumscribe the effective exercise of sovereignty, in which courts play an interpreter’s role in relation to constitutional coherence. In turn, Nick Barber finds sovereignty to persist in so far as it remains compatible with other constitutional values. In conclusion, sovereignty and the rule of law constitute two interdependent columns; it is sovereignty that confers democratic credentials to the rule of law, while sovereignty derives its own legitimation from the rule of law.

Is this true *.The rule of law functions as a normative check on legislative power, albeit in a manner that varies depending on the approach taken. The rule of law can be understood formally (Raz) or substantively (Allan), a dichotomy which is reflected in the approach taken by Lord Steyn. The willingness of Lord Steyn to countenance limits on parliamentary sovereignty is consistent with Allan's substantive conception of the rule of law.

Is this true Within the mixed system of law that operates in the United Kingdom, this ordering has been true all along. In H v Lord Advocate [*] UKSC *, the Scotland Act * was recognised as a constitutional statute that guarantees devolved powers. The roots of this pluralism were exposed earlier in R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No *) [*] * AC *, where the House of Lords acknowledged that Community law had the potential to disapply an Act of Parliament. Although this principle derived from the European Communities Act *, Factortame demonstrated that sovereignty may be qualified by legal obligations recognised through domestic law, thereby foreshadowing the relational conception of sovereignty that Lord Steyn articulated in Jackson.