Arbitration Jurisdiction Clarification

Q56. Brahmani River Pellets Ltd (appellant) entered into an agreement with Kamachi Industries Ltd (respondent) for the sale of iron ore pellets. The loading port was in Orissa and the destination port was in Chennai. The dispute arose between the parties regarding the terms of payment and delivery of goods and the appellant did not deliver goods to the respondent. The respondent claimed damages as he had allegedly bought goods from other sources at a higher rate. However, the appellant denied liability on the ground that the contract was modified later and due to the respondent breaching the terms of the contract dispute arose between the parties. The respondent invoked the arbitration clause. The clause of the agreement of the parties was “Arbitration shall be under Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Law * and the Venue of Arbitration shall be Bhubaneswar.” However, the appellant did not agree to the appointment of an arbitrator. A petition was filed by the respondent under Sec *(*) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, * before the Madras High Court for the appointment of a sole arbitrator. Whether the Madras High Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Section *(*) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, * despite the fact that the agreement contains the clause and venue of arbitration shall be Bhubaneshwar? a. The Madras Court can exercise its jurisdiction in this case as there is an express clause ousting the jurisdiction of all the courts, both Madras and Bhubaneshwar (Orissa High Court) shall have jurisdiction over such a case. b. The Madras Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction in this case since the parties have agreed on the fact that the venue of arbitration would be Bhubaneshwar. c. The Madras High Court can exercise its jurisdiction over this matter as there is no clause that expressly ousts the jurisdiction of the other courts. d. None of the above. Q57. The present petition has been filed by the Petitioners- Anju Jain and Ankit Saggi, under Section * of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, * (hereinafter, '* Act') in respect of a Unit Buyer Agreement executed between the parties dated 17th October, *, by which the Petitioner had booked a flat in World Trade The Quad Residency, Yamuna Expressway, Noida a consideration of Rs.*,*,*/-. The Agreement stipulated the Respondent- M/s. WTQR Noida Development paid rent/returns to the Petitioners from April * to April *. However, payments ceased afterwards. According to the Petitioner, repeated emails, including email dated 12th July, * did not evince any reply. The petitioners had sought relief under Section * of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, *, alleging non-payment of rent. M/s. WTQR Noida Development (Company) raised an objection related to territorial jurisdiction arguing that the said petition was not maintainable since the seat of arbitration was in Noida, and not Delhi. “Clearly in the arbitration clause, the arbitration proceedings are to be held at Delhi. Whether the Court appointed a sole arbitrator and directed for the arbitration proceedings to take place under the Delhi International Arbitration Centre? a. No, since the cause of action has arisen in Noida. b. Yes, since the arbitration clause explicitly stated that arbitration proceedings would take place in Delhi. c. No, since the agreement has been executed in Noida, both the parties are located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. d. None of the above. Q58. Based on your reading of the passage, which of the following statements is/are correct? I. The use of the word ‘seat’ is compulsory in an arbitration agreement to determine the jurisdiction in arbitration proceedings. II. The use of the word ‘seat’ is not compulsory in an arbitration agreement to determine the jurisdiction inarbitration proceedings, the intention of the parties can be deciphered without it. III. The use of the word ‘seat’ is compulsory only in certain cases in an arbitration agreement to determine the jurisdiction in arbitration proceedings, the court cannot determine the jurisdiction for such cases. a. Only III. b. Both I and III. c. Only II. d. None of the above. Q59. Two Petitioners, Petitioner No. *, an online portal operating under the name of www.homelane.com, providing custom home designs, and Petitioner No. *, a company selling pre-designed modular kitchens and wardrobes online in India. Petitioner No. * had demerged and amalgamated into Petitioner No. *. Petitioner No. * had entered into a Master Rental Agreement (“MRA”) with the Respondent, a company offering office equipment and furniture on rental. As per the MRA, Petitioner No. * issued a bank guarantee of Rs. *,*,* to the Respondent to secure the rental arrangement. The Respondent later assigned the rents under the MRA to SREI and reduced the bank guarantee to Rs. *,*,*. Petitioner No.* requested further reduction to Rs. *,*,*, but it was not executed. Despite Petitioner’s requests not to encash the bank guarantee and to reduce it, the Respondent invoked the bank guarantee for Rs. *,*,*. The Petitioners sent legal notices invoking arbitration clauses in the MRA on two occasions but the Respondent refused to refer the dispute to arbitration in response to the first notice, and no response was received after the second notice. Consequently, the Petitioners filed an application under Section * of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, * (“Act”) before the High Court of Calcutta. The venue of the arbitration was specified as Kolkata in Exhibit * of the MRA but, the Special Forum Selection Clause (Clause *) in the MRA conferred exclusive jurisdiction to the Courts in Mumbai for any disputes arising from the agreement. This clause raised the question of whether Kolkata could be the seat of arbitration, given the contrary indicia provided by exclusive jurisdiction to Courts of Mumbai. Despite exclusive jurisdiction granted to Courts in Mumbai, can the Calcutta High Court entertain an Application under Section * of the Act? a. Yes, since the MRA designated Kolkata as the venue for arbitration, and thus, all arbitration related proceedings should be exclusive to Kolkata. b. No, since the Specific Forum Selection Clause in the MRA granted exclusive jurisdiction to the courts in Mumbai, and this clause should override the arbitration clause, designating Kolkata as the venue. c. Yes, since the venue of the arbitration should be considered as seat of arbitration and giving the courts of Mumbai should not be considered as ‘contrary indicia'. d. None of the above.

Q60. In a criminal trial, the prosecution submits a memory card containing digital files as evidence to prove the defendant’s involvement in a crime. The defense argues that the memory card should be treated as a material object rather than a document. According to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, which of the following statements accurately reflects the treatment of electronic records in this context? a. The memory card is considered a material object rather than a document, so it cannot be admitted as evidence under Section 65A of the Indian Evidence Act. b. The memory card is considered a document under Section 65A of the Indian Evidence Act, and its contents are admissible as evidence if they meet the conditions specified in Section 65B. c. The memory card should be excluded from evidence because electronic records are not covered under the Indian Evidence Act and cannot be admitted in court. d. The memory card can only be admitted as evidence if it is accompanied by physical documents proving the authenticity of its contents. Q61. In a case involving the submission of electronic records, the defense argues that the prosecution has failed to produce a certificate as required by Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. According to the principles established by the Supreme Court regarding Section 65B, which of the following statements best reflects the handling of the electronic evidence and the role of the certificate? a. The certificate under Section 65B is not necessary, and the electronic records can be admitted based solely onoral evidence or other forms of documentary evidence. b. The certificate under Section 65B is mandatory and must be produced at the time of presenting the electronic records, as it is required to satisfy the conditions for admissibility. c. The certificate under Section 65B is not explicitly mandated to be presented at a specific stage but is considered valuable when provided, and it holds more weight than oral or documentary evidence. d. The certificate under Section 65B is irrelevant and does not affect the admissibility of electronic records, which can be admitted based on the records alone. Q62. In a trial where the prosecution intends to submit printouts of phone records as evidence, the records were initially accepted without a certificate under Section 65B (*) based on an earlier judgment. However, the defense argues that the later ruling in the case of Anvar P. v. P. K. Basheer should apply. According to the ruling in Anvar P. v. P. K. Basheer, which of the following statements correctly reflects the admissibility of the electronic records under Section 65B? a. Printouts of phone records can be admitted as evidence without a certificate under Section 65B (*) because the earlier ruling allowed for this practice. b. The certificate under Section 65B (*) is not required, and electronic records can be proven through oral evidence or other sources as established by the earlier judgment. c. According to Anvar P. v. P. K. Basheer, Section 65B (*) is mandatory, and electronic records cannot be admitted without a certificate under this section, as the Act does not permit proof through oral evidence. d. The court may consider both the earlier ruling and the Anvar P. v. P. K. Basheer decision, allowing for electronic records to be admitted without a certificate if deemed relevant by the court. Q63. In a criminal case, the prosecution seeks to admit electronic records without a certificate under Section 65B (*). The defense argues that the records should be excluded based on the previous requirement for the certificate. However, the prosecution cites recent rulings that suggest flexibility regarding the certificate requirement. According to the * and * judgments, which of the following statements accurately reflects the current legal stance on the necessity of a Section 65B (*) certificate? a. The certificate under Section 65B (*) is considered a mandatory requirement, and the non-production of such a certificate renders the electronic records inadmissible, regardless of the circumstances. b. The requirement for a certificate under Section 65B (*) is procedural and not mandatory, and the non-production of the certificate can be considered a curable defect under certain circumstances, such as when a party does not control the original device. c. The certificate under Section 65B (*) is not necessary, and electronic records can be admitted based on oral evidence or other forms of documentation as per the rulings from * and *. d. The court must always adhere strictly to the requirement of a Section 65B (*) certificate without any exceptions, regardless of recent judgments or procedural considerations. Q64. In light of the recent case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kishanrao, which addressed contradictions in the interpretation of Section 65B, which of the following statements correctly reflects the court's position on the application of Section 65B in relation to the rest of the Indian Evidence Act? a. Section 65B is subordinate to the other provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and should be interpreted in the context of traditional evidentiary rules. b. Section 65B operates independently of the rest of the Indian Evidence Act, and its provisions for admittingelectronic records are to be applied without regard to other evidentiary rules. c. Section 65B can be interpreted flexibly in light of other provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, allowing for the admission of electronic records even without a certificate under certain circumstances. d. Section 65B should be seen as supplementary to traditional evidentiary rules, and any gaps or contradictions should be resolved by integrating it with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.

Q65. Ms. X, the patient had met with an accident. She had suffered injuries over her head. She was first treated by Dr. Bhartendu Kumar in the Sri Krishna Medical College and Hospital, Noida from where she was referred to the Research Centre of the petitioner where she was undergoing treatment. The informant, being the father of the patient, had given his consent for treatment. It is also an admitted fact that the petitioner is a qualified doctor. In the course of treatment, the patient died. The allegation against the petitioner is that due to non-payment of Rs. *,*/- demanded from the informant, he had threatened to stop the treatment of his daughter. The said allegation has been completely denied by the petitioner. The petitioner has opined that the deceased died due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of the above injuries. Whether the petitioner can be prosecuted under Section 304A IPC alleging medical negligence merely based on the oral statement of some witness without an expert opinion from an expert body? a. Yes, he can be held liable for negligence because of non-payment of Rs. *,*/- demanded from the informant, and threatened to stop the treatment of his daughter. b. No, he cannot be held liable for negligence because the deceased died due to shock and haemorrhage. c. Yes, he can be held liable for negligence because the death occurred due to the deliberate action as alleged by the informant.d. None of the above. Q66. The complainants are the father and son. The son was a minor aged about 6 years when he was diagnosed with a congenital disorder in his left eye (also known as ‘PTOSIS’ or ‘drooping eyelid’) for which a minor surgery was performed on *-*-* by the Doctor at the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh (‘PGI’). The complainant alleges that there was no other defect in the eyes of the son and both eyes had normal vision and the physical deformity diagnosed could have been cured by a minor operation which required lifting of the left eyelid a little to make it of the same size as the right eye but the said surgery was done in a most negligent manner. The complainants through the complaint made to the State Commission, claimed compensation for the sufferings due to negligence of the doctor and a further sum of amount towards the cost of the treatment, loss of studies etc. The complaint case regarding medical negligence against a Doctor and PGI was dismissed by the State Commission. Aggrieved by the above decision, the complainants preferred to appeal before the NCDRC. After remand in the first round, the matter again came up before the NCDRC wherein the impugned order has been passed and the complaint has been partly allowed. The judgment and order of the State Commission dismissing the complaint has been set aside holding that the Doctor and the PGI are jointly and severely liable for payment of compensation. The Doctor and the PGI together have filed a civil appeal aggrieved by the finding of NCDRC. Decide: a. Yes, can be held liable for negligence because he fails to exercise reasonable skill which he possesses in giving the treatment. b. Yes, cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative treatment or course of treatment was available. c. Yes, can be held liable for negligence because that post-surgery the condition of the patient had not improved but has deteriorated. d. None of the above. Q67. A petition moved by the petitioner who was accused of medical negligence under Section * (culpable homicide that does not amount to murder) of the Indian Penal Code. The deceased’s father has alleged that on the direction of the petitioner he took his daughter, aged about eleven years, to XYZ Neuro Care and Research Centre for treatment. As per the advice of the petitioner, he got his daughter admitted in the said Research Centre on payment of Rs.*,*/- and her treatment commenced with infusion of saline. The next deceased’s father arrived at the nursing home and said that the condition of his daughter is improving. He asked him to further deposit Rs.*,*/-. The informant expressed his inability to deposit the amount at once and requested that he would be able to deposit the amount by the evening. Upon this, the petitioner got enraged. He threatened to stop the treatment. When the deceased’s father requested him with folded hands not to stop the treatment, he allegedly detached the pipe through which saline was being infused to his daughter. Thereafter, the petitioner and his compounder pushed him outside the centre. He has further alleged that due to the aforesaid act on the part of the petitioner, the condition of his daughter worsened and she started squirming and ultimately died. Decide: a. No, he cannot be held liable for negligence because due to non-payment of Rs. *,*/- demanded, the petitioner merely threatened to deposit the amount by the evening. b. Yes, he can be held liable for negligence because the petitioner deliberately detached the pipe from the body of the daughter of the informant through which saline was being infused in course of treatment. c. No, he cannot be held liable for negligence because there is no material or evidence on record to show that thedeath of the deceased was due to any negligence on the part of the petitioner. d. None of the above. Q68. A petition moved by a nurse who was accused of medical negligence under Section * (culpable homicide that does not amount to murder) of the Indian Penal Code. The case was registered on the basis of a complaint filed by a man following the death of his *-year-old daughter. The child had been admitted by a doctor because of diarrhoea and vomiting and after giving her some medicines and conducting some tests, the doctor said that she could be taken home after sometime. However, the child's temperature spike in the child's temperature which was brought to the notice of the nurse concerned. She passed away the same day while at the hospital. Decide: a. Yes, a nurse who was accused of medical negligence under Section * is liable due to medication error. b. No, a nurse who was accused of medical negligence under Section * is not liable since the investigation was conducted in a poor manner in order to save those who are actually responsible for the child's death. c. Yes, a nurse who was accused of medical negligence under Section * is liable since the nurse was negligent in her care of the child as she was not able to attend to the child. d. No, a nurse who was accused of medical negligence under Section * is not liable since the child was treated by the doctor and also no prima facie evidence against the nurse.

all this above questions clat exam perspective

all the questions

Q69. What is the distinction between the term victim as provided in Section * (wa) of the CrPC and Section * (y) of the BNSS? a. There is no distinction; both terms mean the same thing. b. Section * (wa) of CrPC defines a victim as someone who has suffered loss or injury due to the actions or omissions of the accused, while Section * (y) of the BNSS defines a victim as someone who has suffered loss or injury due to the actions or omissions of the accused for which he has been charged with. c. The term victim as provided in Section * (y) of the BNSS has been expanded by way of the definition in Section * (wa) of the CrPC. d. None of the above. Q70. Which of the following statements is/are TRUE? I. Section * of BNSS corresponds to Section * of CrPC where the proviso laid down the right of a victim to appeal against an order of acquittal. II. Section * of BNSS corresponds to Section * of CrPC where the proviso laid down the right of a victim to appeal against an order convicting the accused for a lesser offence. III. Section * of BNSS corresponds to Section * of CrPC where the proviso laid down the right of a victim to appeal against imposing inadequate compensation. a. Only I. b. Only II. c. Only I & III. d. All of the above. Q71. The appellant, a Professor who agreed to be a surety for one of his students (3rd respondent) to help him with financial problems. It was stated that instead of showing him as surety, he was made the principal borrower and the loan was taken in his name with the help of other respondents, bank employees. It was stated that this manipulation allowed the loan to be taken out in the appellant's name, effectively ensuring that the 3rd respondent would not have to repay it and that the appellant's property would be at risk of seizure. The appellant herein pointed out irregularities in the functioning of the Bank to the Bank Manager. This led to the registration of a case with the CBI. It was submitted that even though the Bank Manager is the de facto complainant, the appellant is the victim here. The appellant thus challenges the order of the Special Court, CBI acquitting the accused by way of an appeal under proviso to Section * of the BNSS. It was argued that he was cheated and that a person who suffers financial loss and economic disadvantage is a victim and the appeal was maintainable. On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor stated appellant is a witness and cannot claim the status of a victim to prefer an appeal under Section * of the BNSS. It was argued that complaint to the CBI was preferred by the Bank Manager and not by the appellant. Decide: a. Yes, the appellant can be considered as a “victim” since the appellant is not a witness. b. Yes, the appellant can be considered as a “victim” since he was cheated and suffered financial loss and economic disadvantage. c. Yes, the appellant can be considered as a “victim” since the Bank Manager is the de facto complainant, the appellant is the victim. d. None of the above. Q72. Based on your reading of the passage, who can appeal against an order of acquittal under the proviso to Section * of BNSS? a. The de facto complainant who suffered damages or loss as an indirect consequence of the crime. b. The victim who suffered damages or loss as a direct consequence of the crime. c. Both a and b. d. None of the above.

Q73. The respondent wife filed a petition seeking maintenance under Section * of the Cr.PC. The Trial Court after recording evidence, hearing the parties, disposed of the maintenance petition, whereby the learned Trial Court allowed maintenance of Rs. *,* per month to be paid by the husband, petitioner herein, for the maintenance of minor daughter, while rejecting the prayer of maintenance of the wife. Being aggrieved, the wife preferred a criminal revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge. By the impugned Judgment the learned Sessions Judge allowed the revision directing the payment of maintenance of Rs. *,* per month along with arrear by the husband, petitioner herein, in favour of the wife, respondent herein. At the fag-end of inquiry/trial the husband filed a petition on *.*.* contending, inter alia, that the wife had been living in adultery with Sujit Karmakar and both the wife and said Sujit Karmakar used to live in a rented house of Narayan(landlord) as husband and wife effect from *.*.*. The deposition of Sudip, the son of the landlord, they took rent of the house on *.*.* and they had continuously living together in the said house as husband and wife till they were arrested by the police on *.*.*, neither the wife nor Karmakar could furnish any satisfactory explanation regarding their stay together in the house of (landlord). The wife denied the said allegation. Whether the learned Sessions Judge was correct in holding that the wife has not been "living in adultery" on the evidence and materials available on record? a. No, since the wife(respondent) and Sujit Karmakar being arrested from the house of Narayan(landlord) it cannotbe held that the wife has been living in adultery. b. Yes, since the wife-respondent had been living together with another man in a rented house as husband and wife since *.*.*. till they were apprehended by the Police from that house on *.*.*. c. No, since the wife(respondent) and Sujit Karmakar took rent of the house on *.*.* and they stayed together in the house of Narayan (landlord) it cannot be held that the wife has been living in adultery. d. Cannot be determined. Q74. X, the petitioner married Y the respondent, on *-*-*, at Rettaiyoorani in accordance with the custom of their caste. A child A was born to them on *-*-*. The respondent came to know of her intimacy with Z in November-December * itself. The petitioner denied the said allegation, and therefore, he turned the petitioner and child out of his house in or about *. At the intervention of some mediators, she was again taken in the month of August *. But, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent has been dissolved in accordance with the custom of their religion and she was driven out of her matrimonial home only in Nov. *. At that time she was pregnant and she was delivered of a female child on *-*-*. He alleged that the petitioner is living in adultery with Z, neighbour and the second child was born out of the adulterous intercourse with Z, and therefore the petitioner is not entitled to claim maintenance. Whether the petitioner was entitled to maintenance.Decide: a. The petitioner was not entitled to maintenance since the second child was born out of the adulterous intercourse with Z. b. The petitioner was entitled to maintenance since the petitioner denied the said allegation. c. The petitioner was not entitled to maintenance since the petitioner is living in adultery with Z. d. None of the above. Q75. X, the petitioner contended that for four years X and Y were having good relations. Two children were born to them and thereafter when she was four months pregnant, she was assaulted by the respondent. The respondent contended that he was annoyed by the conduct of X as he saw that children were crying at home and X had been coming out of the house of Z, which is adjacent to his house. When he accoster her, she replied arrogantly that he should not ask this question. On this, he gave */* slaps to X and tried to pour kerosene on her person, which was witnessed by B, friend of X, who was the next door neighbour. She was driven away by the respondent when she was four months pregnant. Thereafter she stated that her parents waited for a year and served a notice on the applicant to pay her maintenance. After receipt of the said notice, the respondent filed a case for divorce. The respondent denied the said allegation and further alleged that X is a lady of bad character. She herself has deserted her husband. She is living in adultery and as such he declined to grant her maintenance. Whether the petitioner can be charged for adultery? Decide: a. Yes, since she had been in the house of Z and coming out from his house can be said to be the incident of adultery. b. Yes, since she is a lady of bad character it can be said to be the incident of adultery. c. Yes, since she herself has deserted her husband and is living in adultery it can be said to be the incident of adultery. d. None of the above. Q76. Which of the following statements is/are not true regarding the interpretation of “living in adultery” under Section *(*) of the CrPC? a. The casual living with a person other than husband with sexual relation would not construe 'living in adultery"under Section *(*) of the Cr.PC. b. The casual living of a wife for some occasion with another man cannot be construed to be "living in adultery" within the meaning of Section *(*) of the Cr.PC. c. Both a and b. d. None of the above.

Q77. Based on your reading of the passage, the Court remarked that “every Indian is a citizen of the country first and then only he/she becomes a member of any religion.” Which of the following statements accurately reflects the court’s interpretation? a. The personal law operates under the authority of the legislation and not under any religion and, therefore, the personal law can always be superseded or supplemented by legislation. b. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act apply to all the citizens of India without and beyond India, religion is secondary, and citizenship should come first. c. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act was applicable irrespective of a person’s religion, whether a Hindu, Muslim, Parsi, Christian, etc., citizenship is secondary, and religion should come first. d. None of the above. Q78. Mujamil had an affair with a girl, namely, Reshambanu aged *. Reshambanu one day left her parental home and got married to Mujamil. They got married by performing Nikah at the Ajmer Sharif. The father of Reshambanu lodged a report in that regard alleging the offence of kidnapping by Mujamil of his daughter. It was argued before this Court that Reshambanu being a Muslim girl was within her right under the Personal Muslim Law to get married. It was also argued that Reshambanu was in love with Mujamil and had left her parental home on her own free will and volition. Decide: a. Since Reshambanu had crossed the age of 15 years, it was considered a valid marriage under the Personal Muslim Law. b. Since Reshambanu was a minor being below the age of 15 years at the time of alleged kidnapping, it was not considered a valid marriage under the Personal Muslim Law.c. Since Reshambanu was in love with Mujamil and had left her parental home on her own free will and volition, it was considered a valid marriage under the Personal Muslim Law. d. None of the above. Q79. On *-*-* in the evening Shahnaz Begum (respondent No. *) went out from his house and she was enticed away by respondent No. * who wanted to forcibly marry her. It was further stated that although she was aged about 14 years. She was produced before the Magistrate for passing proper order about her custody. On *-*-*, respondent No. * made a statement under Section * of the Code that she was aged about 18 years 5 months and she had married respondent No. * of her own volition. She further stated that respondent No. * did not entice her; she herself went along with him. Respondent No. * was medically examined by the Lady Doctor pursuant to an order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who was of the opinion that she was above 15 years but below 18 years. A writ application has been filed on behalf of the petitioner, who is the father of respondent No. *, for quashing an order passed by the learned Sessions Judge directing release of respondent No. * in order that she may live with respondent No. * with whom she claims to have married. Decide: a. Yes, since the petitioner being the father, was the natural guardian. b. No, since she was at liberty to live with respondent No. *. c. Yes, since respondent No. * has enticed a minor girl (under 18 years of age) out of the keeping of the lawful guardian without the consent of such guardian. d. None of the above. Q80. The Integrated Child Development Scheme Officer (ICDS Officer) submitted a complaint to the Circle Inspector of Police, informing that a child marriage happened within the jurisdiction of ICDS Alathur Additional. Based on this, a crime was registered alleging offences punishable under Sections * and * of * Act. As per the prosecution, in *, the first accused conducted the marriage of his minor daughter with the second accused as per the religious tenets and rites in Islam. The accused nos. * and * were the President and Secretary of Hidayathul Islam Juma Masjid Mahal Committee. The fifth accused was the witness who signed the record regarding the conduct of the marriage. Therefore, it was alleged that all the accused persons (petitioners) committed the offences. Decide: a. No, the accused persons (petitioners) committed the offences since the accused persons that the parties involved were followers of Islam, hence a marriage below the age of * was not a void one. b. Yes, the accused persons (petitioners) committed the offences since the accused conducted the marriage of his minor daughter with the second accused as not per the religious tenets and rites in Islam. c. No, the accused persons (petitioners) committed the offences since a person belonging to Muslim community, there is a child marriage in his religion which was recognised under Mohammedan Law. d. Yes, the accused persons (petitioners) committed the offences since the marriage being arranged by her parents, against the provisions of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, *. Q81. In the above scenario, whether the minimum age limit fixed as 18 years for a girl and preventing Muslim girls before attaining the age of 18 years under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, * is violating the Constitutional mandate, in view of Mahomedan Personal Law, which permits a girl to marry either on attaining puberty or completing 15 years. Decide: a. Yes. b. No. c. Maybe. d. Cannot be determined.

Q82. Mangal was arrested for selling fake audio cassettes on the footpath in Kannur. The police had seized * cassettes from the accused. He was convicted under Sections *(a) and 52A r/w * of the Copyright Act. Whether the conviction of Mangal (the accused) for allegedly selling fake audio cassettes on the footpath in Kannur can be set aside or not? a. Yes, since the accused (Mangal) obtained permission from the copyright owner to publish and sell the seized cassettes on the footpath in Kannur. b. No, since the accused (Mangal) published the seized cassettes containing the sound recording in respect of anywork without displaying the particulars under Section 52A. c. Yes, since the prosecution has no case that the cassettes allegedly seized from the accused (Mangal) contained any sound recording, and the particulars as required under Section 52A were not displayed. d. None of the above. Q83. Based on your reading of the passage, to attract the offence under Section 52A of the Copyright Act. Which of the following is/are correct? I. The name and address of the person who has made the sound recording. II. The name and address of the owner of the copyright. III. The year of its first publication. a. Only II. b. Only III. c. Both II and III. d. All of the above. Q84. On *.*.*, the Inspector of Police, Town Police Station accompanied by witnesses. At *.* pm, at the place of occurrence, he found that the accused exhibited audio cassettes for sale. His version is that those cassettes were fake. PW2 is an independent witness. He denied having sold any fake cassettes to anybody, including the revision petitioner. PW3 is the Inspector of Police, Town Police Station, Kosra. He is the detecting Officer. His evidence is that on the relevant day, he found that the accused exhibited audio cassettes on a plastic sheet on the footpath. He arrested the accused and seized * audio cassettes. He has not seen anybody purchasing the audio cassettes from the accused. He has not seen the originals of the cassettes as claimed by the prosecution. He has no idea about the owner of the copyright. The evidence tendered by the prosecution shows that the Police seized * cassettes. The prosecution did not know the contents of the same. The prosecution is unaware of the copyright holder. Whether the prosecution failed to establish any of the ingredients to attract the offence under Section *(a) r/w Section * of the Copyright Act? a. No, since the Inspector of Police found that the accused exhibited audio cassettes on a plastic sheet on the footpath. b. Yes, since the prosecution is unaware of the copyright holder. c. No, since the evidence tendered by the prosecution shows that the Police seized * cassettes. d. Yes, since the accused proved that he had a licence to sell audio cassettes. Q85. X, Y and Z bars & restaurants who are alleged to be playing the sound recordings for which the owners of the Copyrights have entered into Licence Agreements with the appellant. The respondents have been playing the said music without any such licence from the appellant and thus, a case of infringement of Copyright had been pleaded. The appeals arise from two suits filed by the appellant seeking injunctions against infringement of Copyright in the sound recordings as also for recovery of money for unauthorisedly playing the sound recordings and thus, communicating the same to the public in different premises of the respondents without any licence. Decide: a. A case of not an infringement, as the X, Y and Z bars & restaurants were unaware of the copyright holder. b. A case of infringement, as the X, Y and Z bars & restaurants playing the said music without any such licence from the appellant. c. A case of not an infringement, as the X, Y and Z bars & restaurants as the playing the music is being used forentertainment. d. A case of infringement, as the X, Y and Z bars & restaurants since playing the music in the public in different premises of the respondents is being used for the profit.