Conviction Reconsideration For Appellants

IN THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT OF PURVA PRADESH...is it high court or appellat court?

should i add sec * and * of bns ..Section * – Definition of Abetment Section * delineates the act of abetment, categorizing it into instigation, conspiracy, and intentional aid. It clarifies that willful misrepresentation or concealment leading to the procurement of a criminal act constitutes instigation. Illustration: Consider a scenario where A, a public officer, misrepresents the identity of Z to B, leading to the wrongful apprehension of C. In this case, B is abetted by instigation to apprehend C. Section * – Abetment of an Offence Section * expands the scope of abetment, stating that abetting the illegal omission of an act can be an offense, even if the abettor is not bound to perform the act. Illustration: If A instigates B to murder C, and B refuses, A is still guilty of abetting B to commit...for issue *?

but is it a valid point tho?

ISSUE *: WHETHER, THE CONVICTION OF MR. BHUSHAN, MR. MAYUR & MR. MAHESH IS LIABLE TO BE SET ASIDE? It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the conviction of Mr. Bhushan, Mr. Mahesh, and Mr. Mayur warrants reconsideration and should be set aside. The trial court's decision is fraught with significant oversights and neglects critical aspects of the case, leading to a miscarriage of justice. The evidence presented and the circumstances surrounding the case necessitate a thorough re-evaluation to ensure that justice is duly served considering the facts that: There was no mala fide Intention and that the grievance was wrongfully addressed by the inferior courts *.* Mr. Bhushan acted in accordance with his duties under § * of police act, * , with the primary aim of preventing illegal activities, specifically drug trafficking. His actions were motivated solely by his commitment to law enforcement and were free of any malafide intention. Therefore, the punishment imposed under Section * of the Indiana Nyaya Sanhita is unjustifiable, as Mr. Bhushan fired the shot without any ulterior motive. In Vijay Singh v. State of U.P. (*) , the court emphasized that police officers can use necessary force while performing their duty to prevent escape and ensure apprehension. This aligns with Mr. Bhushan's actions of firing at Mr. Rakesh's vehicle to prevent an escape, considering it an act within his lawful authority to prevent Mr. Rakesh from escaping, independent of their social disputes. *.* Section * of the Police Act, * emphasizes the importance of police officers fulfilling their duties. Mr. Bhushan’s proactive measures to intercept the contraband reflect his dedication to these duties. By targeting illegal activities like drug trafficking, Mr. Bhushan effectively fulfilled his obligations, ensuring he did not fall short of his responsibilities under the law. *.* Mr. Rakesh was uncooperative and refused to comply with Mr. Bhushan's lawful order to open the vehicle boot for inspection. This refusal constitutes an obstruction of a public servant in performing his duty under Section * of the Indiana Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). This obstruction justified Mr. Bhushan’s attempt to prevent Mr. Rakesh from fleeing, ultimately leading to the unfortunate incident. *.* When Mr. Rakesh was stopped at the check-post by Mr. Bhushan, he refused to comply, asserting that he was not obligated to heed a subordinate officer and attempted to signal Mr. Bhushan to move aside. The Petitioner wishes to emphasize that two additional personnel stationed at the check-post intervened, requesting Mr. Rakesh to open his car boot. They assured him that they would conduct the vehicle inspection, not Mr. Bhushan. Upon opening the car boot, the workers discovered a container. Just as they were about to inspect it, Mr. Rakesh abruptly accelerated and attempted to flee. This sudden act of evasion falls under Section * of the BNS, which addresses the use of force or criminal acts to obstruct a public servant in the execution of their duties. Mr. Rakesh's attempt to escape under these circumstances compelled Mr. Bhushan to respond immediately with his service revolver. He fired three rounds at the vehicle, one of which tragically struck Mr. Rakesh in the chest. It is crucial to note that Mr. Bhushan’s actions were a reaction to Mr. Rakesh’s aggressive and obstructive conduct, not an initial act of aggression. In Puran Mal v. Director of Inspection (*) , The Supreme Court held that actions taken by public servants in the lawful discharge of their duties, including the use of necessary force to prevent evasion, were justified. *.* Drug trafficking is a severe crime that erodes public trust and disrupts societal order. Mr. Mahesh and Mr. Mayur, working under Mr. Bhushan's lawful supervision at the check-post, were tasked with inspecting vehicles. Mr. Bhushan’s actions to intercept Mr. Rakesh's vehicle were in line with this provision, demonstrating his lawful authority to act swiftly in preventing drug trafficking . When Mr. Rakesh attempted to flee, Mr. Bhushan had no choice but to fire at the vehicle, leading to the unfortunate incident. The discrepancies in their statements about the marijuana quantity are likely honest mistakes, not intentional deceit. As administrative workers, they were not trained investigators, and their role was limited to assisting with inspections and maintaining records under high-pressure conditions. Given their adherence to standard procedures and the absence of malicious intent or direct evidence of wrongdoing, their errors should be seen as unintentional, arising from the challenging circumstances they faced, not as criminal acts. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (*) , the court emphasized that discrepancies or inconsistencies in testimony should not automatically lead to an assumption of guilt or deceit, especially when the evidence is circumstantial. This principle is particularly relevant as the minor inconsistencies in Mr. Mahesh and Mr. Mayur's statements regarding the quantity of marijuana should be viewed as honest mistakes rather than intentional deceit. These discrepancies do not undermine their credibility or the lawfulness of their actions under the supervision of Mr. Bhushan, who was fulfilling his duty to prevent drug trafficking.  ISSUE *: WHETHER, MR. BHUSHAN WAS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSING THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION WHICH LED HIM TO EXECUTE THE ALLEGED DRUG BUST EVEN IN A CASE WHERE THE ENTIRE PLOT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONCOCTED? It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that Mr. Bhushan's decision to withhold the source of information was justified and necessary for preserving public safety and the effectiveness of law enforcement. Given the sensitivity of the information and the need to protect informants, disclosing their identities could have adverse consequences for future investigations and public trust. Given that the tip-off was accurate and Mr. Bhushan's actions were based on this credible information, he should not be compelled to reveal the informer's identity to safeguard their safety. On the following grounds, it is demonstrated that Mr. Bhushan acted in accordance with established legal principles and judicial precedents: *.* As under § * of Indiana Sakshya Adhiniyam (Previously known as § * of evidence law), “No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interests would suffer by the disclosure. In R.K. Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (*) The Court emphasized that the privilege of withholding certain information is essential to protect public interest and maintain the efficacy of official duties. And In Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (*) , the Supreme Court emphasized the significance of protecting the sources of information to ensure effective law enforcement and to safeguard public interest. The Court recognized the need to balance this protection with individual rights and fair procedures. *.* § * of ISA (Previously known as § * of evidence act) says that no magistrate or police officer shall be compelled to disclose the source of information regarding the commission of an offense if it would be detrimental to public interest or national security. Mr. Bhushan received critical information in his capacity as a police officer. Revealing the source could compromise the informant's safety and deter future intelligence sharing, which is vital for ongoing and future investigations. In State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh (*) , the Supreme Court held that public officers are not obligated to disclose confidential communications if it would harm public interest, supporting Mr. Bhushan's decision to withhold the source. *.* Given that Mr. Rakesh was a prominent politician, disclosing or documenting the informant's identity could endanger not only the informant but also their entire family. The potential for retaliation from politically influential individuals and party members further underscores the need to maintain confidentiality. In Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab (*) the Court held that the identity of the informant should not be disclosed if it puts their safety at risk, emphasizing the importance of protecting informants in politically sensitive cases. Also, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain (*) the Court recognized that in politically sensitive cases, the necessity to maintain confidentiality is paramount to protect the informant and ensure the integrity of the investigation. *.* The Principle of Public Interest Privilege allows for the withholding of certain information if its disclosure would harm public interest. It is often invoked to protect sensitive information that, if revealed, could compromise public safety, national security, or ongoing investigations. In State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh (*) , The Supreme Court emphasized that protecting the identity of informants and maintaining confidentiality of official communications is essential to safeguard public interest and security. *.* The disclosure of the informant’s identity could severely compromise public interest by discouraging future informants from coming forward, which would hamper law enforcement efforts. *.* Informants provide valuable information under the assurance of confidentiality. Revealing an informant’s identity breaches this trust and discourages others from cooperating with law enforcement . In light of the aforementioned provisions and judicial precedents, it is clear that Mr. Bhushan's actions in protecting the informant's identity were legally sound and necessary for safeguarding public interest and ensuring effective law enforcement. The Court is respectfully requested to recognize the validity of Mr. Bhushan's actions based on the grounds outlined.  ISSUE *: WHETHER, THE INCIDENT OF MR. RAKESH DYING BY MR. BHUSHAN’S BULLET FALLS WITHIN THE GENERAL EXCEPTIONS AS LAID OUT UNDER THE INDIANA NYAYA SANHITA, *. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that Mr. Bhushan’s actions, resulting in the unfortunate death of Mr. Rakesh, were justified under the law. Mr. Bhushan, as a police officer, acted with the intention of preventing a serious crime and in response to an urgent situation. This argument will demonstrate that Mr. Bhushan’s conduct, though resulting in a tragic outcome, was legally protected and justified based on the following grounds: *.* The Indian Nyaya Sanhita, *, which repealed and replaced the Indian Penal Code, * ("IPC"), applies to this case. General Exceptions under the Nyaya Sanhita under Chapter * state that- “Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.” § * of Indiana Nyaya Sanhita, * (previously known as § * of IPC) Justifies actions taken by a person bound by law due to a mistake of fact. Mr. Bhushan believed he was executing his legal duty to prevent a serious crime. *.* § *(*) of INSS (Previously known as *(*) of CrPC) Permits police officers to use "all means necessary" to effect an arrest. Mr. Bhushan’s use of force to prevent Mr. Rakesh’s escape falls within this provision. *.* The principle of Good Faith Actions protects officers acting on credible information, even if procedural requirements are not fully met. § * CrPC supports that Mr. Bhushan’s intent to prevent a drug-related crime was legitimate, ensuring public safety and his actions, aimed at preventing a crime and stopping a person from escaping arrest in response to an immediate threat, fall within the scope of his official duties. In State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew (*) , the Supreme Court held that public servants are entitled to protection under Section * CrPC if their actions were in the discharge of their official duties and in good faith. and Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan (*) support protection under Section * CrPC if the actions were done in good faith within the scope of official duties. R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala (*) also reinforces that public servants are protected under Section * CrPC for actions taken in good faith and in the course of their official duties. *.* § * of the NDPS Act allows arrest without a warrant in drug-related offenses, highlighting the need for prompt action. Mr. Bhushan's response, aimed at preventing the escape of a suspected drug smuggler, was within his statutory authority and aligned with this provision. Therefore, his actions were justified under the NDPS Act. In State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (*) The Supreme Court held that compliance with the procedural requirements of the NDPS Act is essential, but the act of arresting without a warrant in urgent situations is justified if it is done to prevent potential escape and ensure effective enforcement. *.* § * of INSS (Previously known as § * of the CrPC) protects public servants who act in good faith while performing their official duties. Mr. Bhushan’s role as a police officer involves preventing crime and apprehending suspects. If his actions, even if not explicitly covered by his official duties, were carried out with the intention of enforcing the law and maintaining public safety, this section might still apply. *.* In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narsi , the court emphasized that actions should be assessed based on their immediacy and context, focusing on whether they were unpremeditated and aligned with a need to address an urgent situation. The judgment underlines that for an action to be justified, it should be spontaneous. In light of the above arguments, it is respectfully submitted that Mr. Bhushan’s actions were legally justified, undertaken in good faith, and necessary under the circumstances to prevent a serious crime. The protections afforded by the relevant sections of the NDPS Act, CrPC, and IPC, combined with judicial precedents and the Doctrine of Necessity, substantiate that Mr. Bhushan acted within his rights and duties as a law enforcement officer. Therefore, it is prayed that the Court recognize the legitimacy of Mr. Bhushan’s actions and consequently, set aside any conviction or charges related to this incident. ...plz go through this thoroughly n give me the list of all cases i used and all statutes (name) refered what should be the prayer