Foreclosure Appeal Jurisdiction Challenge
Summary
The user is appealing a foreclosure case, arguing that the Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. C. 231A, regarding fraudulent conveyance. The user claims the foreclosure involved usurious interest rates exceeding legal limits, making it void. They emphasize the importance of subject matter jurisdiction and cite relevant case law, including *Ryan v. Kehoe* and *U.S. Bank v. Ibanez*. The user also highlights procedural issues, such as the denial of a jury trial and the failure to meet statutory requirements for nonjudicial foreclosure. The appeal process involves filing a brief, responding to opposing counsel, and awaiting the appellate courts decision on whether to hear the case.Full Conversation
the last one- I cant argue about the substantice arguement as the scope of my appeal is just from the single justice's deny of my energency motion. My response is that is the orginal court lacked jurisdcition than the appeallate court lacked jurisdiction so despite his aguement subject matter jurisdiction is paramount. Is this correct?
Case Rating: *.
You are correct. Subject matter jurisdiction is crucial and can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. If the original court lacked jurisdiction, the appellate court would lack it as well.
Do you have any documentation on the original court's jurisdiction issues to strengthen your argument?
You are correct. Subject matter jurisdiction is crucial and can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. If the original court lacked jurisdiction, the appellate court would lack it as well.
Do you have any documentation on the original court's jurisdiction issues to strengthen your argument?
yes . The southeast housing court doesnt have jurisction under 231A declarartory judgment especially about ffruadulent conveyance .Ryan decisiion.
It looks like you have a strong argument regarding subject matter jurisdiction, especially if you have documentation supporting the claim that the Southeast Housing Court lacked jurisdiction under 231A declaratory judgment related to fraudulent conveyance.
To strengthen your response, you should:
- Clearly cite the Ryan decision and any other relevant case law.
- Emphasize the original court's lack of jurisdiction.
- Reinforce the importance of subject matter jurisdiction in your appeal.
Is there any other specific detail or document you need help with for your informal brief?
To strengthen your response, you should:
- Clearly cite the Ryan decision and any other relevant case law.
- Emphasize the original court's lack of jurisdiction.
- Reinforce the importance of subject matter jurisdiction in your appeal.
Is there any other specific detail or document you need help with for your informal brief?
So once I file the brief counsel will respond and then I can reply and then the appeals court will decide if they will hear th appeal. Is this right?
Yes, your understanding is correct. Here’s the typical process:
- You file the informal brief with supporting evidence.
- Opposing counsel will respond.
- You can reply to their response.
- The appeals court will then review the submissions and decide whether to hear the appeal.
Do you need any further assistance with preparing your reply or understanding the process?
- You file the informal brief with supporting evidence.
- Opposing counsel will respond.
- You can reply to their response.
- The appeals court will then review the submissions and decide whether to hear the appeal.
Do you need any further assistance with preparing your reply or understanding the process?
see above
Yes, you are correct. Once you file your brief, the opposing counsel will respond. You can then reply to their response. After reviewing both sides, the appeals court will decide whether to hear your appeal. Do you need any further assistance with your brief or the process?
See *Ryan v. Kehoe*. As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks authority to hear this case. Will the appeals court look up Ryan v. Kehoe or do I have to explain what the court siad in that case?
You should explain what the court said in Ryan v. Kehoe in your brief. While the appellate court can look up the case, providing a summary strengthens your argument and ensures they understand its relevance to your situation. This makes your brief more persuasive and clearer.
Would you like help summarizing the Ryan v. Kehoe case for your brief?
Would you like help summarizing the Ryan v. Kehoe case for your brief?
Please polish:The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, has no claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thus assisting in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“Even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A[ uniform fraudulent transfer act]action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in the area of housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve such issues as whether the defendant is solvent, see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *, whether the defendant is engaged in business, see G.L.c. 109A, § * (*
Here's your polished text:
"The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“Even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whether the defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it. *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c.109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case.
"The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“Even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whether the defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it. *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c.109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case.
ed.), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent. See G.L.c. 109A, § *. To allow the Housing Court to hear such actions ‘would be to dilute the expertise of that court and to delay the resolution of disputes properly before it.’ LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co., supra at *, quoting Haas v. Breton, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c. 109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks authority to hear this case.
Here's a polished version:
"The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby participating in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe.*
Even if the claim under c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] touches on housing occupants' welfare, such actions involve issues beyond the Housing Court's expertise and legislative mandate. For instance, fraudulent transfer cases might involve:
- Defendant's solvency (G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *)
- Defendant's business engagement (G.L.c. 109A, § *)
- Fraudulent intent in conveyance (G.L.c. 109A, § *)
Allowing the Housing Court to handle such cases would dilute its expertise and delay proper dispute resolution. See LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co., quoting Haas v. Breton, * Mass. *, * (*). Thus, the Housing Court's lack of jurisdiction extends to the Appellate Court and the single justice as well."
Would you like any further assistance with your brief?
"The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby participating in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe.*
Even if the claim under c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] touches on housing occupants' welfare, such actions involve issues beyond the Housing Court's expertise and legislative mandate. For instance, fraudulent transfer cases might involve:
- Defendant's solvency (G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *)
- Defendant's business engagement (G.L.c. 109A, § *)
- Fraudulent intent in conveyance (G.L.c. 109A, § *)
Allowing the Housing Court to handle such cases would dilute its expertise and delay proper dispute resolution. See LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co., quoting Haas v. Breton, * Mass. *, * (*). Thus, the Housing Court's lack of jurisdiction extends to the Appellate Court and the single justice as well."
Would you like any further assistance with your brief?
so does the reader know that i am directly quoting from Ryan v. Kehoe ?
Yes, the reader will recognize that you are directly quoting from *Ryan v. Kehoe* because you have cited the case and used quotation marks. To make it even clearer, you could use a phrase like "As stated in *Ryan v. Kehoe*," before the quote.
Is there anything else you need help with regarding your brief?
Is there anything else you need help with regarding your brief?
The way that i have written it do i have to explain what 109A Uniform fraudlent tranfer Act is? Or by citing for example fraud transfers might invlove issues ...in my case I am establishing primia fascia evidence of a fruadlent transfer and have a right to be heard but housing court can not ajudiciate it. Do i need to add anything here. if so please revise.
No need to explain the entire 109A Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act if it's already cited and relevant issues are mentioned. Here's a polished version of your text:
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The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“As stated in *Ryan v. Kehoe*, even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whether the defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it. *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c. 109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case.
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Would you like any further revisions or assistance?
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The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“As stated in *Ryan v. Kehoe*, even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whether the defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it. *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c. 109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case.
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Would you like any further revisions or assistance?
see above
It sounds like you're in a complex legal situation. Here's a potential revision for your brief:
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"The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“As stated in *Ryan v. Kehoe*, ‘Even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whether the defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it.’ *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c. 109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case."
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You don't necessarily need to explain what the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is since you've cited relevant sections indicating the issues it addresses. However, if you feel it would strengthen your argument, you could briefly mention that it deals with fraudulent transfers, insolvency, and business engagements.
Would you like to add more detail or have any other questions?
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"The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“As stated in *Ryan v. Kehoe*, ‘Even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whether the defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it.’ *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c. 109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case."
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You don't necessarily need to explain what the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is since you've cited relevant sections indicating the issues it addresses. However, if you feel it would strengthen your argument, you could briefly mention that it deals with fraudulent transfers, insolvency, and business engagements.
Would you like to add more detail or have any other questions?
In my case appellate is alledging a fruadlent conveyance that is outside of the scope of southeast housing court to ajudicate. Can you please insert.
Sure, here's a revised statement:
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"In my case, the appellee is alleging a fraudulent conveyance that is outside the scope of the Southeast Housing Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate. The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“As stated in *Ryan v. Kehoe*, ‘Even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whether the defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it.’ *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c. 109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case."
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Would you like any further assistance with your brief or any other legal questions?
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"In my case, the appellee is alleging a fraudulent conveyance that is outside the scope of the Southeast Housing Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate. The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“As stated in *Ryan v. Kehoe*, ‘Even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whether the defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it.’ *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c. 109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case."
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Would you like any further assistance with your brief or any other legal questions?
see above
Case Rating: *
Sure! Here's the revised text:
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"The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“As stated in *Ryan v. Kehoe*, ‘Even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whether the defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it.’ *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c. 109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
In my case, the appellant is alleging a fraudulent conveyance that is outside the scope of the Southeast Housing Court to adjudicate. As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case."
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Would you like to add or modify anything else?
Sure! Here's the revised text:
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"The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“As stated in *Ryan v. Kehoe*, ‘Even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whether the defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it.’ *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c. 109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
In my case, the appellant is alleging a fraudulent conveyance that is outside the scope of the Southeast Housing Court to adjudicate. As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case."
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Would you like to add or modify anything else?
I think I need to change this:The appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A, procedure for declaratory judgments, and failed to establish ownership of the subject property under the Massachusetts statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *.
The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, has no claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, and thus assisted in an action of a fraudulent conveyance of an asset which the appellant has a right to have addressed in a court of subject matter jurisdiciton. Appelle has assisted in a fruadulent conveyance the housing court can no longer ajudicate this case as its outside of the scope of the court. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*. Please polish as i want to show that becuase of the appelle's action's that have come to new evidence.
Here's the polished version with the added details:
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The appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A, procedure for declaratory judgments, and failed to establish ownership of the subject property under the Massachusetts statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *.
The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, has no claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset, which the appellant has a right to have addressed in a court of subject matter jurisdiction. The appellee's actions have contributed to a fraudulent conveyance, which is outside the scope of the Southeast Housing Court to adjudicate. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“As stated in *Ryan v. Kehoe*, ‘Even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whetherthe defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it.’ *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c. 109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case.
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Would you like to add any more details or need further assistance?
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The appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A, procedure for declaratory judgments, and failed to establish ownership of the subject property under the Massachusetts statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *.
The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, has no claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby aiding in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset, which the appellant has a right to have addressed in a court of subject matter jurisdiction. The appellee's actions have contributed to a fraudulent conveyance, which is outside the scope of the Southeast Housing Court to adjudicate. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
“As stated in *Ryan v. Kehoe*, ‘Even where, as in this case, the claim underlying a c. 109A [Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate in housing. For example, fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whetherthe defendant is solvent (see G.L.c. 109A, §§ *, *), whether the defendant is engaged in business (see G.L.c. 109A, § *), or whether the conveyance was made with fraudulent intent (see G.L.c. 109A, § *). Allowing the Housing Court to hear such actions would dilute the expertise of that court and delay the resolution of disputes properly before it.’ *LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.*, quoting *Haas v. Breton*, * Mass. *, * (*). We conclude that there is not a sufficient nexus between c. 109A actions and housing to support the extension of the Housing Court's jurisdiction to such actions.”
As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks the authority to hear this case.
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Would you like to add any more details or need further assistance?
see above
Here's the polished version:
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The appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A, procedure for declaratory judgments, and failed to establish ownership of the subject property under the Massachusetts statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *. The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, has no claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby assisting in a fraudulent conveyance of an asset. This new evidence further supports the appellant's right to have the case addressed in a court with appropriate subject matter jurisdiction. As a result, the Housing Court can no longer adjudicate this case as it is outside the scope of the court. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
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Do you need any additional assistance with your brief or any other legal matter?
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The appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A, procedure for declaratory judgments, and failed to establish ownership of the subject property under the Massachusetts statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *. The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, has no claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby assisting in a fraudulent conveyance of an asset. This new evidence further supports the appellant's right to have the case addressed in a court with appropriate subject matter jurisdiction. As a result, the Housing Court can no longer adjudicate this case as it is outside the scope of the court. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*.
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Do you need any additional assistance with your brief or any other legal matter?
Appellee’s Lack of Standing:
The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, has no claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, assisting in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. The lack of valid title means the appellee cannot establish standing. Even if Housing Court could hear a declarartory judgement act appelle must meet the prereguiste standing which it can not meet. Please polish
Here's the polished version:
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Appellee’s Lack of Standing:
The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks the claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thus assisting in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. The absence of valid title means the appellee cannot establish standing. Even if the Housing Court could hear a declaratory judgment action, the appellee must meet the prerequisite standing, which it cannot.
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Is there anything else you need assistance with?
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Appellee’s Lack of Standing:
The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks the claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thus assisting in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. The absence of valid title means the appellee cannot establish standing. Even if the Housing Court could hear a declaratory judgment action, the appellee must meet the prerequisite standing, which it cannot.
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Is there anything else you need assistance with?
see above
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Appellee’s Lack of Standing:
The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby assisting in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. The lack of valid title means the appellee cannot establish standing. Even if the Housing Court could hear a declaratory judgment action, the appellee must meet the prerequisite standing, which it cannot.
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Anything else you need assistance with?
Appellee’s Lack of Standing:
The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, lacks claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, thereby assisting in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. The lack of valid title means the appellee cannot establish standing. Even if the Housing Court could hear a declaratory judgment action, the appellee must meet the prerequisite standing, which it cannot.
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Anything else you need assistance with?
"Decisions of a single justice will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear error of law or abuse of discretion." Fogarty v. Commonwealth, * Mass. *, * (*). "Parties seeking relief pursuant to G. L. c. *, § *, must demonstrate both a violation of their substantive rights and the absence of another adequate or effective avenue of relief" (quotations and citation omitted). McDonough, petitioner, * Mass. *, *-* (*). how does this affect my argument that the original court did not have sugject matter jurisdiction? Is it beciase in order to abuse its discretion it first must have subject matter?
To answer your question, the original court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental issue that can be raised at any stage. The quotes from *Fogarty* and *McDonough* emphasize the necessity to demonstrate clear error or abuse of discretion. If the original court lacked jurisdiction, any decision it made could be considered an abuse of discretion.
Do you need help with any specific part of your argument?
Do you need help with any specific part of your argument?
Please include in addtion the single justice's order deniels of my motion for an emergency stay in this section Right to a Jury Trial:
Under Massachusetts law, parties have the right to a jury trial in cases involving fraud, including fraud in the execution of contracts. This right is guaranteed by Article * of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (*).The failure to provide a jury trial for the fraud in the execution claim is a significant due process violation. Additionally, the judge did not conduct a trial or make .
Sure, here's the polished text with your additional request:
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Right to a Jury Trial:
Under Massachusetts law, parties have the right to a jury trial in cases involving fraud, including fraud in the execution of contracts. This right is guaranteed by Article * of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (*). The failure to provide a jury trial for the fraud in the execution claim is a significant due process violation. Additionally, the judge did not conduct a trial or make findings of fact or conclusions of law to support liability under Chapter 231A. See *Glendale Associates, LP v. Kevin K. Harris*, * Mass. App. Ct. *, and *Adjartey v. Central Division of Housing Court Department*, * Mass. *, * (*).
The Housing Court's failure to conduct a trial or make necessary findings further compounded the procedural issues. This denial of a fair trial underscores the necessity for the appeal to be heard and the judgments to be reconsidered. Additionally, the single justice's order denying my motion for an emergency stay exacerbates these issues and highlights the need for appellate review.
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Do you need any more help with your brief or any other legal questions?
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Right to a Jury Trial:
Under Massachusetts law, parties have the right to a jury trial in cases involving fraud, including fraud in the execution of contracts. This right is guaranteed by Article * of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (*). The failure to provide a jury trial for the fraud in the execution claim is a significant due process violation. Additionally, the judge did not conduct a trial or make findings of fact or conclusions of law to support liability under Chapter 231A. See *Glendale Associates, LP v. Kevin K. Harris*, * Mass. App. Ct. *, and *Adjartey v. Central Division of Housing Court Department*, * Mass. *, * (*).
The Housing Court's failure to conduct a trial or make necessary findings further compounded the procedural issues. This denial of a fair trial underscores the necessity for the appeal to be heard and the judgments to be reconsidered. Additionally, the single justice's order denying my motion for an emergency stay exacerbates these issues and highlights the need for appellate review.
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findings of fact or conclusions of law to support liability under Chapter 231A.
See *Glendale Associates, LP v. Kevin K. Harris*, * Mass. App. Ct. *, and *Adjartey v. Central Division of Housing Court Department*, * Mass. *, * (*).
The Housing Court's failure to conduct a trial or make necessary findings further compounded the procedural issues. This denial of a fair trial underscores the necessity for the appeal to be heard and the judgments to be reconsidered
Got it. Here's the polished text including your additional request:
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Right to a Jury Trial:
Under Massachusetts law, parties have the right to a jury trial in cases involving fraud, including fraud in the execution of contracts. This right is guaranteed by Article * of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (*). The failure to provide a jury trial for the fraud in the execution claim is a significant due process violation. Additionally, the judge did not conduct a trial or make findings of fact or conclusions of law to support liability under Chapter 231A. See *Glendale Associates, LP v. Kevin K. Harris*, * Mass. App. Ct. *, and *Adjartey v. Central Division of Housing Court Department*, * Mass. *, * (*).
The Housing Court's failure to conduct a trial or make necessary findings further compounded the procedural issues. This denial of a fair trial underscores the necessity for the appeal to be heard and the judgments to be reconsidered. Additionally, the single justice's order denying my motion for an emergency stay exacerbates these issues and highlights the need for appellate review.
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Is there anything more specific you need help with?
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Right to a Jury Trial:
Under Massachusetts law, parties have the right to a jury trial in cases involving fraud, including fraud in the execution of contracts. This right is guaranteed by Article * of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (*). The failure to provide a jury trial for the fraud in the execution claim is a significant due process violation. Additionally, the judge did not conduct a trial or make findings of fact or conclusions of law to support liability under Chapter 231A. See *Glendale Associates, LP v. Kevin K. Harris*, * Mass. App. Ct. *, and *Adjartey v. Central Division of Housing Court Department*, * Mass. *, * (*).
The Housing Court's failure to conduct a trial or make necessary findings further compounded the procedural issues. This denial of a fair trial underscores the necessity for the appeal to be heard and the judgments to be reconsidered. Additionally, the single justice's order denying my motion for an emergency stay exacerbates these issues and highlights the need for appellate review.
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Im a confused becuase I just read thisImproper mortgage assignment. A mortgagor only has a right to challenge a mortgage assignment on the grounds that it is void, and not merely voidable. Bank v. Wain, * Mass. App. Ct. * (*). Massachusetts law gives a presumption of validity to mortgage assignments that comply with a number of requirements of the law. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. *, § 54B. Courts have upheld the use of the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) for assigning mortgages. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., * F.3d * (1st. Cir. *). How does the former apply to the chain of titile here:Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage:
The information you read pertains to the challenge of mortgage assignments, stating that only assignments that are void can be contested, not those that are merely voidable. Courts in Massachusetts generally presume the validity of mortgage assignments if they comply with legal requirements.
To apply this to your situation regarding fraudulent origination of the mortgage:
- Your argument should focus on proving the mortgage assignment is void (e.g., due to fraud), rather than voidable.
- Highlight any evidence of fraudulent actions or irregularities in the mortgage origination process.
- Stress the significance of proper assignments under Mass. Ann. Laws ch. *, § 54B.
- Use relevant case law, such as *Bank v. Wain* and *Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs.*, to substantiate your claims.
Do you need any further clarification on this matter?
To apply this to your situation regarding fraudulent origination of the mortgage:
- Your argument should focus on proving the mortgage assignment is void (e.g., due to fraud), rather than voidable.
- Highlight any evidence of fraudulent actions or irregularities in the mortgage origination process.
- Stress the significance of proper assignments under Mass. Ann. Laws ch. *, § 54B.
- Use relevant case law, such as *Bank v. Wain* and *Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs.*, to substantiate your claims.
Do you need any further clarification on this matter?
As previously stated, the mortgage was executed through fraud in the execution, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. *, §§ * & *, a complete chain of title must be established.
See *McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.* Moreover, the chain must be complete with each link in the chain of title documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed. G.L. c. *, §§ * & *. *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *): Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title. *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): A deed signed incomplete due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title. *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title. Additionally, the "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
Your argument seems strong based on the evidence of fraud, lack of consideration, and statutory violations.
To strengthen your position regarding the chain of title and the void nature of the mortgage, you should:
- Emphasize that the mortgage was void ab initio due to fraud and statutory violations.
- Clearly cite G.L. c. *, §§ * & *, and relevant case law (*McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank*, *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.*, *In Re Samuels*, *Flavin v. Morrissey*, and *Smigliani v. Smigliani*).
- Explain the necessity of a complete and unbroken chain of title as mandated by law.
- Highlight any missing or improper assignments that invalidate the chain of title.
Would you like further assistance on how to structure this argument or any other specific part of your brief?
To strengthen your position regarding the chain of title and the void nature of the mortgage, you should:
- Emphasize that the mortgage was void ab initio due to fraud and statutory violations.
- Clearly cite G.L. c. *, §§ * & *, and relevant case law (*McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank*, *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.*, *In Re Samuels*, *Flavin v. Morrissey*, and *Smigliani v. Smigliani*).
- Explain the necessity of a complete and unbroken chain of title as mandated by law.
- Highlight any missing or improper assignments that invalidate the chain of title.
Would you like further assistance on how to structure this argument or any other specific part of your brief?
Please revise this section:Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage:
As previously stated, the mortgage was executed through fraud in the execution, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. *, §§ * & *, a complete chain of title must be established.
See *McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.* Moreover, the chain must be complete with each link in the chain of title documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed. G.L. c. *, §§ * & *. *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *):
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Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage:
The mortgage was executed through fraud, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *), a complete chain of title must be established.
- *See McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.*
- Each link in the chain of title must be documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *).
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *): Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An incomplete deed due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *,* (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
- The "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
Would you like any additional information or assistance with another part of your brief?
The mortgage was executed through fraud, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *), a complete chain of title must be established.
- *See McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.*
- Each link in the chain of title must be documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *).
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *): Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An incomplete deed due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *,* (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
- The "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
Would you like any additional information or assistance with another part of your brief?
Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title. *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): A deed signed incomplete due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title. *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title. Additionally, the "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
Sure, here's the polished section:
Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage:
As previously stated, the mortgage was executed through fraud in the execution, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. *, §§ * & *, a complete chain of title must be established. See *McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.* Moreover, the chain must be complete with each link in the chain of title documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed. G.L. c. *, §§ * & *.
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D. Mass. *): Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): A deed signed incomplete due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*,* Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
Additionally, the "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
Do you need any further assistance with your brief or any other legal questions?
Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage:
As previously stated, the mortgage was executed through fraud in the execution, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. *, §§ * & *, a complete chain of title must be established. See *McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.* Moreover, the chain must be complete with each link in the chain of title documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed. G.L. c. *, §§ * & *.
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D. Mass. *): Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): A deed signed incomplete due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*,* Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
Additionally, the "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
Do you need any further assistance with your brief or any other legal questions?
- You advised me to focus on proving the mortgage assignment is void (e.g., due to fraud), rather than voidable.
- Highlight any evidence of fraudulent actions or irregularities in the mortgage origination process.
- Stress the significance of proper assignments under Mass. Ann. Laws ch. *, § 54B.
- Use relevant case law, such as *Bank v. Wain* and *Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs.*, to substantiate your claims. please revise Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage to stress that the assignment is void due to fraud and not voidable.
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Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage:
The mortgage was executed through fraud, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *), a complete chain of title must be established.
- *McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.*: Highlight the necessity for a complete chain of title.
- Each link in the chain of title must be documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *).
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *): Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An incomplete deed due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
- The "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
To focus on the mortgage assignment being void due to fraud, consider the following:
- Stress that the assignment is void, not merely voidable, by demonstrating fraudulent actions or irregularities in the mortgage origination process.
- Highlight the legal requirements for proper assignments under Mass. Ann. Laws ch. *, § 54B.
- Use relevant case law to substantiate your claims:
- *Bank v. Wain*, * Mass. App. Ct. * (*): Establishes that only void assignments can be challenged.
- *Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs.*, * F.3d * (1st. Cir. *): Upholds the use of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) for assigning mortgages, emphasizing the need for proper assignments.
Would you like further assistance with any other sections of your brief?
Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage:
The mortgage was executed through fraud, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *), a complete chain of title must be established.
- *McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.*: Highlight the necessity for a complete chain of title.
- Each link in the chain of title must be documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *).
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *): Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An incomplete deed due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
- The "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
To focus on the mortgage assignment being void due to fraud, consider the following:
- Stress that the assignment is void, not merely voidable, by demonstrating fraudulent actions or irregularities in the mortgage origination process.
- Highlight the legal requirements for proper assignments under Mass. Ann. Laws ch. *, § 54B.
- Use relevant case law to substantiate your claims:
- *Bank v. Wain*, * Mass. App. Ct. * (*): Establishes that only void assignments can be challenged.
- *Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs.*, * F.3d * (1st. Cir. *): Upholds the use of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) for assigning mortgages, emphasizing the need for proper assignments.
Would you like further assistance with any other sections of your brief?
see above
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Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage:
The mortgage was executed through fraud, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *), a complete chain of title must be established, emphasizing that the assignment is void due to fraud, not merely voidable.
- *See McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.*
- Each link in the chain of title must be documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *).
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *): Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An incomplete deed due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
- The "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
- Proper assignments under Mass. Ann. Laws ch. *, § 54B, must be stressed to highlight the fraudulent actions and irregularities in the mortgage origination process.
Would you like further assistance with any other part of your brief?
Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage:
The mortgage was executed through fraud, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *), a complete chain of title must be established, emphasizing that the assignment is void due to fraud, not merely voidable.
- *See McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.*
- Each link in the chain of title must be documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *).
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *): Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An incomplete deed due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
- The "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
- Proper assignments under Mass. Ann. Laws ch. *, § 54B, must be stressed to highlight the fraudulent actions and irregularities in the mortgage origination process.
Would you like further assistance with any other part of your brief?
I think that I need to state that mass A mortgagor only has a right to challenge a mortgage assignment on the grounds that it is void, and not merely voidable. Bank v. Wain, * Mass. App. Ct. * (*). Appellant has a right to challenge the assignment .
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Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage:
The mortgage was executed through fraud, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *), a complete chain of title must be established:
- *McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.* emphasize the need for an unbroken chain of title.
- Each link in the chain of title must be documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *).
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *): stresses the necessity of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An incomplete deed due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*,* N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
- The "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
Additionally, the mortgage assignment must be void due to the fraudulent origination, not merely voidable. Under *Bank v. Wain*, * Mass. App. Ct. * (*), a mortgagor can only challenge a mortgage assignment on the grounds that it is void. Furthermore, the presumption of validity for mortgage assignments under Mass. Ann. Laws ch. *, § 54B must be rebutted by highlighting the fraudulent actions and irregularities in the origination process.
Do you need any more details or assistance with another part of your brief?
Fraudulent Origination of the Mortgage:
The mortgage was executed through fraud, lacked consideration, and violated statutes, making it void ab initio. Under Massachusetts law (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *), a complete chain of title must be established:
- *McCarthy v. Brockton Nat. Bank* and *Sargent v. Tenaska, Inc.* emphasize the need for an unbroken chain of title.
- Each link in the chain of title must be documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed (G.L. c. *, §§ * & *).
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *): stresses the necessity of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An incomplete deed due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*,* N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
- The "famous" Bevilacqua and Ibanez decisions also support this principle.
Additionally, the mortgage assignment must be void due to the fraudulent origination, not merely voidable. Under *Bank v. Wain*, * Mass. App. Ct. * (*), a mortgagor can only challenge a mortgage assignment on the grounds that it is void. Furthermore, the presumption of validity for mortgage assignments under Mass. Ann. Laws ch. *, § 54B must be rebutted by highlighting the fraudulent actions and irregularities in the origination process.
Do you need any more details or assistance with another part of your brief?
Can you revise this section by even changing the title. Usury Statute (Chapter *):
Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court does not have jurisdiction to address claims under this statute. The foreclosure in this case involved interest rates far exceeding the legal limit, with rates in excess of *%. The alleged private lenders did not notify the Attorney General before charging the interest rate as required. Massachusetts usury laws are considered a statute of public policy, meaning they represent a clear legislative statement regarding the state's intention to protect borrowers from excessively high interest .
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Usury Laws and Jurisdiction:
- Under Chapter *, Section *, only the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts can void a loan under usury laws.
- The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction to address usury claims.
- The foreclosure in this case involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit.
- The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General before charging these rates, as required.
- Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from excessively high interest rates, reflecting a strong public policy stance.
Do you have any specific evidence or documents related to the interest rates charged by the lenders?
- Under Chapter *, Section *, only the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts can void a loan under usury laws.
- The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction to address usury claims.
- The foreclosure in this case involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit.
- The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General before charging these rates, as required.
- Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from excessively high interest rates, reflecting a strong public policy stance.
Do you have any specific evidence or documents related to the interest rates charged by the lenders?
rates and predatory lending practices. This is evident in the criminal penalties associated with violating the usury statute in the state. The appellant recived a default notice claiming she owed wildly inflated amounts the loan sharking activity was in noncomplaince with MA ususry laws rendering the foreclsoure "wholly void"Massachusetts requires strict compliance with the requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure. U.S. Bank v. lbanez, * Mass. *, * (*). If a foreclosure sale does not comply with statutory requirements, it is “wholly void.” United States Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. lbanez, * Mass. *, * (*), citing McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass. *, * (*).in noncompliance See *Begelfer v. Najarian.*"In sum, the
Usury Statute and Jurisdiction:
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliance renders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass. *, * (*)).
- Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidates the foreclosure.
Would you like assistance with another section or any other legal matter?
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliance renders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass. *, * (*)).
- Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidates the foreclosure.
Would you like assistance with another section or any other legal matter?
Legislature has determined, as it may, that a lender who does not comply with the requirements of Section * may not charge interest and expenses in excess of twenty per cent a year. Since the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty per cent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G. L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced." In keeping since the default notice that the appellant recieved were wildly egrious way over twenty percent it violates section * and can not be enforeced. In addition it simultaeously is in nocomplaince with reguirements for a nonjudicial foreclsoure as no where on the mortgae does it state the terms of a usuaruous interest rate to compound to usury rates as it calls for simple interst of *%
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Usury Statute and Jurisdiction:
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliance renders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass. *, * (*)).
- Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidate the foreclosure.
- Legislative Policy: The legislature determined that a lender who does not comply with Section 49may not charge interest and expenses exceeding twenty percent a year. Since the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced.
- Non-Compliance with Mortgage Terms: The mortgage does not state the terms of a usurious interest rate, as it calls for simple interest of *%. Therefore, the foreclosure is in non-compliance with the requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure.
Would you like assistance with any other sections or further details on your case?
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliance renders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass. *, * (*)).
- Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidate the foreclosure.
- Legislative Policy: The legislature determined that a lender who does not comply with Section 49may not charge interest and expenses exceeding twenty percent a year. Since the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced.
- Non-Compliance with Mortgage Terms: The mortgage does not state the terms of a usurious interest rate, as it calls for simple interest of *%. Therefore, the foreclosure is in non-compliance with the requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure.
Would you like assistance with any other sections or further details on your case?
please correct:Since the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced. Rather since the default notice that the appellant recieved and the alleged lenders used that amount to foreclsoe on the property..
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Since the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced. The default notice that the appellant received, which was used by the alleged lenders to foreclose on the property, is therefore invalid.
Since the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced. The default notice that the appellant received, which was used by the alleged lenders to foreclose on the property, is therefore invalid.
see above
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Usury Statute and Jurisdiction:
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliance renders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass. *, * (*)).
- Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidate the foreclosure.
- Legislative Policy: The legislature determined that a lenderwho does not comply with Section * may not charge interest and expenses exceeding twenty percent a year. Since the default notice received by the appellant showed interest rates and charges exceeding twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced.
- Non-Compliance with Mortgage Terms: The mortgage does not state the terms of a usurious interest rate, as it calls for simple interest of *%. Therefore, the foreclosure is in non-compliance with the requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure.
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Usury Statute and Jurisdiction:
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliance renders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass. *, * (*)).
- Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidate the foreclosure.
- Legislative Policy: The legislature determined that a lenderwho does not comply with Section * may not charge interest and expenses exceeding twenty percent a year. Since the default notice received by the appellant showed interest rates and charges exceeding twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced.
- Non-Compliance with Mortgage Terms: The mortgage does not state the terms of a usurious interest rate, as it calls for simple interest of *%. Therefore, the foreclosure is in non-compliance with the requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure.
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should i include See *Begelfer v. Najarian.*In sum, the Legislature has determined, as it may, that a lender who does not comply with the requirements of Section * may not charge interest and expenses in excess of twenty per cent a year. Since [ in this case] the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty per cent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G. L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced."
Yes, you should include the reference to *Begelfer v. Najarian* as it reinforces the legislative policy against excessive interest rates. Here's how to incorporate it:
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Usury Statute and Jurisdiction:
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Non-Compliance with Mortgage Terms: The mortgage does not state the terms of a usurious interest rate, as it calls for simple interest of *%. Therefore, the foreclosure is in non-compliance with the requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliancerenders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass. *, * (*)).
- Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidate the foreclosure.
- Legislative Policy: The legislature determined that a lender who does not comply with Section * may not charge interest and expenses exceeding twenty percent a year. Since the default notice received by the appellant showed interest rates and charges exceeding twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced. See *Begelfer v. Najarian*: "In sum, the Legislature has determined, as it may, that a lender who does not comply with the requirements of Section * may not charge interest and expenses in excess of twenty percent a year. Since [in this case] the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced."
Would you like assistance with any other sections or further details on your case?
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Usury Statute and Jurisdiction:
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Non-Compliance with Mortgage Terms: The mortgage does not state the terms of a usurious interest rate, as it calls for simple interest of *%. Therefore, the foreclosure is in non-compliance with the requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliancerenders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass. *, * (*)).
- Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidate the foreclosure.
- Legislative Policy: The legislature determined that a lender who does not comply with Section * may not charge interest and expenses exceeding twenty percent a year. Since the default notice received by the appellant showed interest rates and charges exceeding twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced. See *Begelfer v. Najarian*: "In sum, the Legislature has determined, as it may, that a lender who does not comply with the requirements of Section * may not charge interest and expenses in excess of twenty percent a year. Since [in this case] the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced."
Would you like assistance with any other sections or further details on your case?
In addition the orginal note that i signed under fruad in the executuion is also in violation of usury section *. Although on the face of the note the terms stste an *% interest rate my financial ommitted that the $*,* invoice that he charged me was fianced into the alleged debt . Meaning that the true iterest rate was *% as the invoice represented *% of the *,* alleged debt therfore *+* = *. It was a *% note and therfore unenforecalble under the usuary laws in addition to being uneforecable due to fraud in the executuion. Please include this section
Sure, here's the revised section with your additional details:
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Usury Statute and Jurisdiction:
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Non-Compliance with Mortgage Terms: The mortgage does not state the terms of a usurious interest rate, as it calls for simple interest of *%. Therefore, the foreclosure is in non-compliance with the requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliance renders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass480, * (*)).
- Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidate the foreclosure.
- Legislative Policy: The legislature determined that a lender who does not comply with Section * may not charge interest and expenses exceeding twenty percent a year. Since the default notice received by the appellant showed interest rates and charges exceeding twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced. See *Begelfer v. Najarian*: "In sum, the Legislature has determined, as it may, that a lender who does not comply with the requirements of Section * may not charge interest and expenses in excess of twenty percent a year. Since [in this case] the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced."
- Fraudulent Execution and True Interest Rate: In addition, the original note that I signed under fraud in the execution is also in violation of usury Section *. Although the note states an *
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Usury Statute and Jurisdiction:
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Non-Compliance with Mortgage Terms: The mortgage does not state the terms of a usurious interest rate, as it calls for simple interest of *%. Therefore, the foreclosure is in non-compliance with the requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliance renders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass480, * (*)).
- Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidate the foreclosure.
- Legislative Policy: The legislature determined that a lender who does not comply with Section * may not charge interest and expenses exceeding twenty percent a year. Since the default notice received by the appellant showed interest rates and charges exceeding twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced. See *Begelfer v. Najarian*: "In sum, the Legislature has determined, as it may, that a lender who does not comply with the requirements of Section * may not charge interest and expenses in excess of twenty percent a year. Since [in this case] the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced."
- Fraudulent Execution and True Interest Rate: In addition, the original note that I signed under fraud in the execution is also in violation of usury Section *. Although the note states an *
see above
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Usury Statute and Jurisdiction:
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Non-Compliance with Mortgage Terms: The mortgage does not state the terms of a usurious interest rate, as it calls for simple interest of *%. Therefore, the foreclosure is in non-compliance with the requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliance renders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass. *, * (*)).
-Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidate the foreclosure.
- Legislative Policy: The legislature determined that a lender who does not comply with Section * may not charge interest and expenses exceeding twenty percent a year. Since the default notice received by the appellant showed interest rates and charges exceeding twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced. See *Begelfer v. Najarian*: "In sum, the Legislature has determined, as it may, that a lender who does not comply with the requirements of Section * may not charge interest and expenses in excess of twenty percent a year. Since [in this case] the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced."
- Fraudulent Origination and Additional Usury Violation: The original note signed under fraud in the execution is also in violation of usury Section *. Although the note states an *% interest rate, my financial advisor omitted that a $*
- Exclusive Jurisdiction: Under Chapter *, Section *, the Massachusetts Superior and Supreme Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to void a loan under usury laws. The Southeast Housing Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
- Excessive Interest Rates: The foreclosure involved interest rates exceeding *%, far above the legal limit. The private lenders failed to notify the Attorney General, violating the usury laws.
- Public Policy: Massachusetts usury laws are designed to protect borrowers from predatory lending practices, with criminal penalties for violations.
- Non-Compliance with Mortgage Terms: The mortgage does not state the terms of a usurious interest rate, as it calls for simple interest of *%. Therefore, the foreclosure is in non-compliance with the requirements for a nonjudicial foreclosure.
- Nonjudicial Foreclosure Compliance: Massachusetts requires strict compliance for nonjudicial foreclosures (U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, * Mass. *, * (*)). Non-compliance renders the foreclosure "wholly void" (McCreevey v. Charlestown Savings Bank, * Mass. *, * (*)).
-Wholly Void Foreclosure: The inflated amounts claimed in the default notice and non-compliance with usury laws invalidate the foreclosure.
- Legislative Policy: The legislature determined that a lender who does not comply with Section * may not charge interest and expenses exceeding twenty percent a year. Since the default notice received by the appellant showed interest rates and charges exceeding twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced. See *Begelfer v. Najarian*: "In sum, the Legislature has determined, as it may, that a lender who does not comply with the requirements of Section * may not charge interest and expenses in excess of twenty percent a year. Since [in this case] the default provision in the note causes the total interest and charges to exceed twenty percent a year, it violates the legislative policy embodied in G.L. c. *, Section *, and cannot be enforced."
- Fraudulent Origination and Additional Usury Violation: The original note signed under fraud in the execution is also in violation of usury Section *. Although the note states an *% interest rate, my financial advisor omitted that a $*