Invalid Foreclosure Appeal Strategy

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By complaint in the Southeast Housing Court, appellee, L & S Realty LLC, sought a declaration that a foreclosure deed granted to it by Pensco Trust Company Custodian FBO James Tiernan and Pensco Trust Company Custodian FBO Richard Fagan [alleged lenders], being the holder from current mortgages from James Cronan [former husband] and Karen Merritt [appellant], entitled it to exercise the statutory power of sale upon the alleged default. Appellee sought, under G.L. c. 231A, to declare the rights as between appellee and the appellant and others, and issue its decision granting a judgment declaring that at all times from and after the date of the foreclosure deed, the appellant was unlawfully occupying the property as neither a tenant at will nor a tenant at sufferance, but rather as a trespasser. This complaint was filed on August *, *.
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This appeal under FRCP *(b)(*) addresses the fundamental issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any stage, including on appeal. It is crucial to counter the appellees' argument that my appeal is limited in scope. If the original court lacked jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks authority to proceed. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. 231A, § *, the Housing Court does not have jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment asserted by appellee due to fraudulent conveyance, rendering any subsequent orders invalid. Additionally, the appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A.

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This appeal is brought under FRCP *(b)(*), addressing lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a fundamental issue that can be raised at any stage, including on appeal. It is essential to address the appellees' argument that my appeal is limited in scope. Contrary to their assertion, if the original court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks the authority to proceed on the merits. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. 231A, § *, the Housing Court does not have jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment asserted by appellee due to fraudulent conveyance. Any subsequent orders are thus invalid.
Additionally, the appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A and failed to establish ownership of the property under the MA statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *.
The single justice's denial of my emergency motions to stay execution further compounded procedural issues. Despite providing documented evidence, including the alleged lender's testimony confessing to his illegal foreclosure on the subject property, the default notice showing the usurious interest

Sure, here’s a more impactful and concise version:
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This appeal is brought under FRCP *(b)(*), which concerns lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This defense can be raised on appeal as it is a fundamental issue that cannot be waived and can be brought up at any stage of the proceedings.
It is essential to address the appellees' argument that my appeal is limited in scope. Contrary to their assertion, if the original court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks the authority to proceed on the merits. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. 231A, § *, the Housing Court does not have jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment asserted by appellee due to fraudulent conveyance. Any subsequent orders are thus invalid.
Additionally, the appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A and failed to establish ownership of the property under the MA statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *.
The single justice's denial of my emergency motions to stay execution further compounded procedural issues. Despite providing documented evidence, including the alleged lender's testimony confessing to hisillegal foreclosure on the subject property, the default notice showing the usurious interest rate, the fabricated foreclosure deed, and evidence of irreparable harm, the single justice stated:
"I have carefully reviewed the proceedings that have transpired subsequent to the dismissal of the defendant's appeal from the judgment...the defendant has failed to establish a likelihood of success from those orders. Accordingly, the defendant's motion is denied. (Desmond, J.) Notice/Attest/Michaud, J."
This ruling is flawed. The appellant established that the Southeast Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the appellee had no standing. Consequently, the appellate court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The denial of the emergency motions is thus erroneous and should be reconsidered in light of the jurisdictional issues.
Due process violations in this case include the denial of a fair trial, proper notice, and the right to present defenses. These violations render any judgments void and highlight the necessity for this appeal to be heard.
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Certainly! Here’s a polished version incorporating your points and relevant case law:
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This appeal is brought under FRCP *(b)(*), which concerns lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This defense is fundamental and can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.
It is essential to address the appellees' argument that my appeal is limited in scope. Contrary to their assertion, if the original court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks the authority to proceed on the merits. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. 231A, § *, the Housing Court does not have jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment asserted by appellee due to fraudulent conveyance. Any subsequent orders are thus invalid.
Additionally, the appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A and failed to establish ownership of the property under the MA statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *. As pertinent here, a declaratory judgment action may proceed only if the following conditions are met: "(a) an actual controversy sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss must appear on the pleadings; and (b) even if there is a finding of an actual controversy, a plaintiff must demonstrate the requisite legal standing to secure its resolution." Galipault v. Wash Rock Invs., LLC, * Mass. App. Ct. *, *, * N.E.2d * (*). "Declaratory relief is reserved for real controversies and is not a vehicle for resolving abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot questions." Libertarian Assn. of Mass. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, * Mass. *, *.
The single justice's denial of my emergency motions to stay execution further compounded procedural issues. Despite providing documented evidence, including the alleged lender's testimony confessing to his illegal foreclosure on the subject property, the default notice showing the usurious interest rate, the fabricated foreclosure deed, and evidence of irreparable harm, the single justice stated:
"I have carefully reviewed the proceedings that have transpired subsequent to the dismissal of the defendant's appeal from the judgment...the defendant has failed to establish a likelihood of success from those orders. Accordingly, the defendant's motion is denied. (Desmond, J.) Notice/Attest/Michaud, J."
This ruling is flawed. The appellant established that

Sure, here’s a polished version incorporating the necessary points:
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As pertinent here, a declaratory judgment action may proceed only if the following conditions are met: "(a) an actual controversy sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss must appear on the pleadings; and (b) even if there is a finding of an actual controversy, a plaintiff must demonstrate the requisite legal standing to secure its resolution." *Galipault v. Wash Rock Invs., LLC*, * Mass. App. Ct. *, *, * N.E.2d * (*). "Accordingly, declaratory relief is reserved for real controversies and is not a vehicle for resolving abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot questions." *Libertarian Assn. of Mass. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d * (*).
An "actual controversy" exists when there is "a real dispute caused by the assertion by one party of a legal relation, status or right in which he has a definite interest." A plaintiff must demonstrate the requisite legal standing to secure its resolution. The question here is whether a foreclosure deed is sufficient to establish a definite interest or legalstatus in the property to seek the court to evict the appellant. If an entity in good faith purchased a property at a legal foreclosure proceeding, it would suffice to have legal standing. However, Massachusetts law does not grant a third party ownership of a home purchased at foreclosure solely based on a foreclosure deed, especially if it is fabricated. The answer is no.
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As pertinent here, a declaratory judgment action may proceed only if the following conditions are met: "(a) an actual controversy sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss must appear on the pleadings; and (b) even if there is a finding of an actual controversy, a plaintiff must demonstrate the requisite legal standing to secure its resolution." *Galipault v. Wash Rock Invs., LLC*, * Mass. App. Ct. *, *, * N.E.2d * (*). "Accordingly, declaratory relief is reserved for real controversies and is not a vehicle for resolving abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot questions." *Libertarian Assn. of Mass. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d * (*).
An "actual controversy" exists when there is "a real dispute caused by the assertion by one party of a legal relation, status or right in which they have a definite interest." The question here is whether a foreclosure deed is sufficient to establish a definite interest or legal status in the property to seek the court to evict the appellant. Rightfully, if an entity in good faith purchased a property at a legal foreclosure proceeding, it would suffice to have legal standing. But would it? Let's proceed. Does Massachusetts law grant a third party a home purchased at foreclosure with solely a showing of a foreclosure deed (setting aside whether it is fabricated)? The answer is no.
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In Massachusetts, when a home is sold at a foreclosure sale, the lender commonly purchases the property. Occasionally, an unrelated buyer may buy the property, often when it's in a desirable location or has significant equity, such as in this case. The town's tax-assessed value was $*,*, and the alleged lenders sold it to the appellee for *% below market rate.
Would you like more detailed information on foreclosure sale processes or specific legal arguments regarding your case?

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In Massachusetts, when a home is sold at a foreclosure sale, the lender commonly purchases the property. Occasionally, an unrelated buyer may buy the property, often when it's in a desirable location or has significant equity, such as in this case. The town's tax-assessed value was $*,*, and the alleged lenders sold it to the appellee for *% below the market rate for comparable properties.
However, buying a foreclosed property comes with enormous risks. Massachusetts law is abundantly clear that the failure to strictly comply with the foreclosure process makes the foreclosure void. Consequently, if a foreclosure is void, it transfers no title. If a mistake occurred in the foreclosure, even years in the past, the property's title is compromised. *Ibanez* and *Bevilacqua* are two examples of major foreclosure law cases on this matter. See also *Pinti v. Emigrant Mortgage*, where the court held that a foreclosing entity needs to strictly comply with paragraph * of the standard mortgage, reaffirming that even minor defects can have serious consequences on the validity of a foreclosure. In other words, the appellee needs to defend a foreclosure it never performed and bears the full burden of proving itwas done correctly.
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court acting under general principles of equity jurisprudence has broad power to reform, rescind, or cancel written instruments, including mortgages, on grounds such as fraud, mistake, accident, or illegality.” *Beaton v. Land Court*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*), appeal dismissed, * U.S. *, * S.Ct. *, * L.Ed.2d * (*).
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Here’s the revised and concise version of your section:
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In Massachusetts, when a home is sold at a foreclosure sale, the lender commonly purchases the property. Occasionally, an unrelated buyer may buy the property, often when it's in a desirable location or has significant equity, such as in this case. The town's tax-assessed value was $*,*, and the alleged lenders sold it to the appellee for *% below market rate.
However, buying a foreclosed property comes with significant risks. Massachusetts law is clear that failure to strictly comply with the foreclosure process makes the foreclosure void. Consequently, a void foreclosure transfers no title. If a mistake occurred in the foreclosure, even years in the past, the property’s title

Sure, here’s the revised and more concise version highlighting the necessary points:
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In Massachusetts, when a home is sold at a foreclosure sale, the lender commonly purchases the property. Occasionally, an unrelated buyer may buy the property, often when it's in a desirable location or has significant equity, such as in this case. The town's tax-assessed value was $*,*, and the alleged lenders sold it to the appellee for *% below market rate.
However, buying a foreclosed property comes with enormous risks. Massachusetts law is clear that failure to strictly comply with the foreclosure process renders the foreclosure void, transferring no title. If a mistake occurred in the foreclosure, even years in the past, the property's title is compromised. Examples include *Ibanez* and *Bevilacqua*. See also *Pinti v. Emigrant Mortgage*, which holds that strict compliance with the foreclosure process is necessary.
The appellee must defend a foreclosure it never performed and bears the full burden of proving it was done correctly to establish title, standing, and a true controversy under G.L. c. 231A. G.L.c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L.c. *, § * authorize a foreclosure sale under astatutory power of sale. Foreclosure under the statutory power of sale does not require court approval except for a determination under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (* U.S.C.A. App., §§ *-*) that the borrower is not currently in military service. A foreclosure sale under the statutory power of sale may be based on incomplete, backdated, fraudulent, or forged documentation. Such practices in Massachusetts are subject to challenge under the Consumer Protection Act, G.L. c. 93A, §§ * & *, and the attorney general's regulations at * CMR *.* & *.*. Additionally, “a court acting under general principles of equity jurisprudence has broad power to reform, rescind, or cancel written instruments, including mortgages, on grounds such as fraud, mistake, accident, or illegality.” *Beaton v. Land Court*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*), appeal dismissed, * U.S. *, * S.Ct. *, * L.Ed.2d * (*).
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*. This principle is crucial in ensuring the validity of the foreclosure process and the legitimacy of the title transferred.
In this case, the appellee relied on a purported assignment that did not establish a complete chain of title. The failure to document each link with a separate mortgage assignment deed as required by G.L. c. *, §§ * & * renders the foreclosure invalid. The absence of a complete chain of title means that the appellee cannot claim ownership of the property, and any subsequent conveyance is fraudulent.
The necessity of a complete chain of title is emphasized in several key cases:
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *), which highlights the importance of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*), where a deed signed incomplete due to failure to name the grantee was deemed invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *, * (*), which found that an altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
These cases collectively affirm that any foreclosure proceeding must establish a complete chain of title, and any deviation from this requirement invalidates the foreclosure and any subsequent title claims.
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Sure, here’s the revised and concise version highlighting the necessary points:
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Beware of a foreclosing lender which attempts to rely on a purported assignment or fraudulent conveyance or series of assignments establishing anything less than a complete chain of title. The chain must be complete with each link in the chain of title documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed. G.L.c. *, §§ * & *.
- *In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *): Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title.
- *Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): A deed signed incomplete due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
- *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
In any foreclosure proceeding, the foreclosing party must establish a complete chain of title with

Sure, here’s the revised and concise version highlighting the necessary points, along with the context in which it should be inserted:
Context in Brief:
This can be included in the section discussing the necessity of establishing a complete chain of title and the issues surrounding the foreclosure process.
Polished Version:
Beware of a foreclosing lender which attempts to rely on a purported assignment or fraudulent conveyance or series of assignments establishing anything less than a complete chain of title. The chain must be complete with each link in the chain of title documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed. G.L. c. *, §§ * & *.
*In Re Samuels*, * B.R. *, * & n. * (Bkrtcy. D.Mass. *): Emphasizes the necessity of a complete chain of title.
*Flavin v. Morrissey*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d *, * (*): A deed signed incomplete due to failure to name the grantee was invalid and conveyed no title.
*Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, *

Sure, here’s the revised and concise version highlighting the necessary points from *Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * onward:
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*Smigliani v. Smigliani*, * Mass. *, *-*, * N.E.2d *, * (*): An altered instrument was ineffective as a conveyance and conveyed no title.
In any foreclosure proceeding, the foreclosing party must establish a complete chain of title with each link documented by a separate mortgage assignment deed under G.L. c. *, §§ * & *.
In the "famous" Bevilacqua decision, a plaintiff did not have standing to maintain an action to try title under G.L. c. *, §§ *-*. Although the plaintiff was in physical possession of the property, they could not establish "record title" as required by G.L. c. *, § *. Record title cannot be established by a single recorded quitclaim deed transferring title from the grantor bank to the plaintiff, especially when the chain of title rests on a foreclosure sale conducted by the grantor bank, which was not the assignee of the mortgage at the time of the purported foreclosure.
Therefore, like in Bevilacqua, the appellee must trace their chain of title back from the quitclaim deed, through the foreclosure deed, and ultimately to the mortgage granted by James Tiernan and Richard Fagan, custodians of Pensco Trust Company, who purported to foreclose on the property and conduct a sale pursuant to the power of sale contained in the mortgage.
However, here the alleged lenders did not sell under the power of sale as nowhere in the purported mortgage did it state the terms of a compound interest rate in violation of usury laws.
This principle is crucial in ensuring the validity of the foreclosure process and the legitimacy of the title transferred.
In this case, the appellee relied on a purported assignment that did not establish a complete chain of title. The failure to document each link with a separate mortgage assignment deed as required by G.L. c. *, §§ * & * renders the foreclosure invalid. The absence of a complete chain of title means that the appellee cannot claim ownership of the property, and any subsequent conveyance is fraudulent.
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Since Godbout Law Inc. filed a declaratory judgment action in Superior Court roughly one month before this case, seeking the court to declare that members of the foreclosing party, especially Ralph Grieco (financial advisor), did not violate Massachusetts predatory lending laws (G.L. c. 183C) or consumer protection laws (G.L. c. 93A) when providing the alleged mortgages to the appellant in *, it appears that Godbout Law would attempt to use such an opinion here to shield itself from any potential future controversy that might arise in the Superior Court case. However, see *Wells Fargo Financial Massachusetts, Inc. v. Smith*.
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Since Godbout Law Inc. filed a declaratory judgment action in Superior Court roughly one month before this case, seeking the court to declare that members of the foreclosing party, especially Ralph Grieco (financial advisor), did not violate Massachusetts predatory lending laws (G.L. c. 183C) or G.L. c. 93A when providing the alleged mortgages to the appellant in *, it appears that Godbout Law intended to use such an opinion to shield itself from any potential future controversy that might arise in the Superior Court action.
However, in *Wells Fargo Financial Massachusetts, Inc. v. Deborah M. Mulvey & another*, the plaintiff was not entitled to such an adjudication. See *Duane v. Quincy*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d * (*), quoting from *Cole v. Chief of Police of Fall River*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d * (*), appeal dismissed, * U.S. *, * S.Ct. *, * L.Ed. * (*) ("Parties are not entitled to decisions upon abstract propositions of law unrelated to some live controversy"). See also *Commissioner of Correction v. Ferguson*, * Mass. *, *, * N.E.2d * (*) (declining to answer reported question where, "[i]n effect, what the [plaintiff] seeks is an advisory opinion as to his future course of conduct"). Here, if the foreclosing party were to transfer a valid conveyance in the future, it does not automatically grant the appellee the right to the property.
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joint attorney representation, the law imputes the knowledge of the attorney Godbout Law to the appellee itself. See *Braxton v. City of Boston*, * LCR *, * (Mass. Land Court *). Additionally, at the time of the fraudulent conveyance or foreclosure event, appellant’s attorney Eric Renner verbally informed an agent of the appellee that continuing with the purchase would lead to a lawsuit. Thus, the appellant and their counsel informed the appellee before filing this case, establishing that there is no controversy. The appellee had full knowledge of the appellant's defenses to ownership of the property, the invalid foreclosure, and that they were accepting a purported title.

Sure, here’s a more concise and polished version:
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Here, the appellee's complaint does not allege an actual controversy between the parties and states no compelling facts to suggest one exists. There was no valid transfer of title between the alleged lenders and the appellee, who claims to hold a valid foreclosure deed. The existence of a live dispute cannot be inferred purely from the appellant's alleged mortgage default, especially given the evidence suggesting the appellee was not a "good faith buyer" but rather assisted in the fraudulent conveyance.
Moreover, due to joint attorney representation, the law imputes the knowledge of the attorney Godbout Law to the appellee itself. See *Braxton v. City of Boston*, * LCR *, * (Mass. Land Court *). Additionally, at the time of the fraudulent conveyance or foreclosure event, appellant’s attorney Eric Renner verbally informed an agent of the appellee that purchasing the property would result in a lawsuit. Therefore, where the appellant, as well as their counsel, informed the appellee before filing this case, there is no controversy. The appellee had full knowledge of the appellant's defenses to ownership of the property, the invalid foreclosure, and that they were accepting a purported title.
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Sure, here’s the revised version:
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Moreover, Section * of G.L. c. 231A states that the court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceedings or for other sufficient reasons. There was and is a pending Superior Court lawsuit whereby Godbout Law Inc first filed its declaratory judgment act on June *, *, seeking the court to establish ownership and rights on the subject property. This fact was omitted from the Housing Court.
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Sure, here’s the revised version incorporating your points clearly and concisely:
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Lack of Actual Controversy:
Here, the appellee's complaint does not allege an actual controversy between the parties and states no compelling facts to suggest one exists. There was no valid transfer of title between the alleged lenders and the appellee, who claims to hold a valid foreclosure deed. The existence of a live dispute cannot be inferred purely from the appellant's alleged mortgage default, especially given the evidence suggesting the appellee was not a "good faith buyer" but rather assisted in the fraudulent conveyance.
Moreover, due to joint attorney representation, the law imputes the knowledge of the attorney Godbout Law to the appellee itself. See *Braxton v. City of Boston*, * LCR *, * (Mass. Land Court *). Additionally, at the time of the fraudulent conveyance or foreclosure event, appellant’s attorney Eric Renner verbally informed an agent of the appellee that purchasing the property would result in a lawsuit. Therefore, where the appellant, as well as their counsel, informed the appellee before filing this case, there is no controversy. The appellee had full knowledge of the appellant's defenses to ownership of the property, the invalid foreclosure, and that they were accepting a purported title.
Declaratory Judgment and Pending Superior Court Case:
Moreover, under Section *, the court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceedings or for other sufficient reasons. There was and is a pending Superior Court lawsuit whereby Godbout Law Inc. first filed its declaratory judgment act on June *, *, seeking the court to establish ownership and rights to the subject property. This fact was omitted from the Housing Court, and both the appellee and my attorney failed to cite it as well.
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Moreover, Section * of G.L. c. 231A states that the court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceedings or for other sufficient reasons. There was and is a pending Superior Court lawsuit whereby Godbout Law Inc. first filed its declaratory judgment action on June *, *, seeking the court to establish ownership and rights to the subject property. This fact was omitted from the Housing Court.
Additionally, my attorney failed to cite this critical information.
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Sure, here’s a revised version of your introduction to emphasize that the single justice's decision lacked subject matter jurisdiction and not merely a procedural error:
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Introduction
It is essential to address the appellees' argument that my appeal is limited in scope. Contrary to their assertion, if the original court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks the authority to proceed on the merits. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. 231A, § *, the Housing Court does not have jurisdiction over declaratory judgments. Any subsequent orders are thus invalid.
Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, and a court cannot gain jurisdiction simply because the parties agree to it; if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case. Additionally, the appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A and failed to establish ownership of the property under the Massachusetts statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *.
The single justice's denial of my emergency motions to stay execution further compounded due process violations. Despite providing documented evidence, including the lender's testimony confessing tohis part in the illegal foreclosure, the default notice showing the usurious interest rate, the fabricated foreclosure deed, and evidence of irreparable harm, the single justice stated:
"I have carefully reviewed the proceedings that have transpired subsequent to the dismissal of the defendant's appeal from the judgment...the defendant has failed to establish a likelihood of success from those orders. Accordingly, the defendant's motion is denied. (Desmond, J.) Notice/Attest/Michaud, J."
This ruling is flawed. The appellant established that the Southeast Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the appellee had no standing. Consequently, the appellate court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The denial of the emergency motions is thus erroneous and should be reconsidered in light of the jurisdictional issues.
Due process violations in this case include the denial of a fair trial, proper notice, and the right to present defenses. These violations render any judgments void and highlight the necessity for this appeal to be heard.
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This revised introduction emphasizes the lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the due process violations, making it clear that the issue is not merely procedural. If you need further assistance with any other sections or specific legal arguments, please let me know!

Sure, here’s the revised introduction emphasizing that the single justice's decision lacked subject matter jurisdiction:
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Introduction
This appeal is brought under FRCP *(b)(*), which concerns lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This defense can be raised on appeal as it is a fundamental issue that cannot be waived and can be brought up at any stage of the proceedings.
It is essential to address the appellees' argument that my appeal is limited in scope. Contrary to their assertion, if the original court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks the authority to proceed on the merits. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. 231A, § *, the Housing Court does not have jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment asserted by appellee due to fraudulent conveyance. Any subsequent orders are thus invalid.
Additionally, the appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A and failed to establish ownership of the property under the MA statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *.
The single justice's denial of my emergency motions to stay execution further compounded procedural issues. Despite providing documented evidence, including the alleged lender's testimony confessing to his illegal foreclosure on the subject property, the default notice showing the usurious interest rate, the fabricated foreclosure deed, and evidence of irreparable harm, the single justice stated:
"I have carefully reviewed the proceedings that have transpired subsequent to the dismissal of the defendant's appeal from the judgment...the defendant has failed to establish a likelihood of success from those orders. Accordingly, the defendant's motion is denied. (Desmond, J.) *Notice/Attest/Michaud, J.*"
This ruling is flawed. The appellant established that the Southeast Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the appellee had no standing. Consequently, the appellate court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The denial of the emergency motions is thus erroneous and should be reconsidered in light of the jurisdictional issues.
Due process violations in this case include the denial of a fair trial, proper notice, and the right to present defenses. These violations render any judgments void and highlight the necessity for this appeal to be heard.
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Sure, here’s the revised introduction making it clear that the single justice's decision lacked subject matter jurisdiction:
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Introduction
This appeal is brought under FRCP *(b)(*), addressing lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a fundamental issue that can be raised at any stage, including on appeal. It is essential to address the appellees' argument that my appeal is limited in scope. Contrary to their assertion, if the original court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks the authority to proceed on the merits. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. 231A, § *, the Housing Court does not have jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment asserted by appellee due to fraudulent conveyance. Any subsequent orders are thus invalid.
Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, and a court cannot gain jurisdiction simply because the parties agree to it; if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case. Additionally, the appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A and failed to establish ownership of the property under the Massachusetts statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *.
The single justice's denial of my emergency motions to stay execution further compounded procedural issues and demonstrated a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Despite providing documented evidence, including the alleged lender's testimony confessing to his illegal foreclosure on the subject property, the default notice showing the usurious interest rate, the fabricated foreclosure deed, and evidence of irreparable harm, the single justice stated:
"I have carefully reviewed the proceedings that have transpired subsequent to the dismissal of the defendant's appeal from the judgment...the defendant has failed to establish a likelihood of success from those orders. Accordingly, the defendant's motion is denied. (Desmond, J.) Notice/Attest/Michaud, J."
This ruling is flawed. The appellant established that the Southeast Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the appellee had no standing. Consequently, the appellate court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The denial of the emergency motions is thus erroneous and should be reconsidered in light of the jurisdictional issues.
Due process violations in this case include the denial of a fair trial, proper notice, and the right to present defenses. These violations render any judgments void and highlight the necessity for this appeal to be heard.
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Would you like assistance with any other sections or specific

Sure, here’s the revised introduction incorporating your points clearly:
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Introduction
This appeal is brought under FRCP *(b)(*), addressing lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a fundamental issue that can be raised at any stage, including on appeal. It is essential to address the appellees' argument that my appeal is limited in scope. Contrary to their assertion, if the original court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks the authority to proceed on the merits. Under Massachusetts law, specifically G.L. c. 231A, § *, the Housing Court does not have jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment asserted by appellee due to fraudulent conveyance. Any subsequent orders are thus invalid.
Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, and a court cannot gain jurisdiction simply because the parties agree to it; if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case. Additionally, the appellee has not met the burden to establish a real controversy under G.L. c. 231A and failed to establish ownership of the property under the Massachusetts statutory power of sale, as required by G.L. c. *, §§ *-17C and G.L. c. *, § *.
The appellee, not being a party to a legally required foreclosure, has no claim or standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, assisting in the fraudulent conveyance of an asset. See *Ryan v. Kehoe*. As the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court, including the single justice, also lacks authority to hear this case.
The single justice's denial of my emergency motions to stay execution further compounded procedural issues and demonstrated a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Despite providing documented evidence, including the alleged lender's testimony confessing to his illegal foreclosure on the subject property, the default notice showing the usurious interest rate, the fabricated foreclosure deed, and evidence of irreparable harm, the single justice stated:
"I have carefully reviewed the proceedings that have transpired subsequent to the dismissal of the defendant's appeal from the judgment...the defendant has failed to establish a likelihood of success from those orders. Accordingly, the defendant's motion is denied. (Desmond, J.) Notice/Attest/Michaud, J."
This ruling is flawed. The appellant established that the Southeast Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the appellee had no standing. Consequently, the appellate court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The denial of the emergency motions is thus erroneous and

Sure, here’s the revised and concise version highlighting the necessary points:
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Moreover, although the Housing Court may hear usury claims under Chapter *, Section *, the foreclosure in this case involved interest rates far exceeding the legal limit, with a rate in excess of *%. See *Ryan*. Following a trial, the judge found that the disputed conveyances rendered Kehoe insolvent. Therefore, the judge ruled, the conveyances could be set aside under G.L.c. 109A, § * (* ed.). Further, the judge ruled that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a finding that Kehoe, the plaintiff, permitted the conveyances to be set aside under G.L.c. 109A, § * (* ed.).
Here, the criminal usurious interest rendered the appellant insolvent, supporting the evidence sufficient to find that the appellee, the foreclosing party, and their attorneys had actual intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud." Therefore, the violation of criminal usury supports the fraudulent conveyance claim. The Southeast Housing Court does not have the jurisdiction to address claims under this statute.
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Would you like assistance with any other sections or specific legal arguments?

Sure, here’s the revised and concise version highlighting the necessary points:
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Moreover, although the Housing Court may hear usury claims under Chapter *, Section *, the foreclosure in this case involved interest rates far exceeding the legal limit, with a rate in excess of *%. See *Ryan*. Following a trial, the judge found that the disputed conveyances rendered Kehoe insolvent. Therefore, the judge ruled, the conveyances could be set aside under G.L.c. 109A, § * (* ed.). Further, the judge ruled that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a finding that Kehoe, the plaintiff, permitted the conveyances to be set aside under G.L.c. 109A, § * (* ed.).
Here, the criminal usurious interest rendered the appellant insolvent, supporting the evidence sufficient to find that the appellee, the foreclosing party, and their attorneys had actual intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud." Therefore, the violation of criminal usury supports the fraudulent conveyance claim. The Southeast Housing Court does not have the jurisdiction to address claims under this statute.
Fraudulent transfer cases might involve issues such as whether the defendant is solvent (see G.L.c.

Sure, here’s the revised version:
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Moreover, although the Housing Court may hear usury claims under Chapter *, Section *, the foreclosure in this case involved interest rates far exceeding the legal limit, with a rate in excess of *%. In *Ryan v. Kehoe*, following a trial, the judge found that the disputed conveyances rendered Kehoe insolvent. Therefore, the judge ruled that the conveyances could be set aside under G.L. c. 109A, § *. Further, the judge ruled that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a finding that Kehoe had actual intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud," permitting the conveyances to be set aside under G.L. c. 109A, § *.
Here, the criminal usurious interest rendered the appellant insolvent, supporting a finding that the appellee, the foreclosing party, and the attorneys had actual intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud." Therefore, the violation of criminal usury supports the fraudulent conveyance claim. The Southeast Housing Court does not have the jurisdiction to address claims under this statute, highlighting the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the Southeast Housing Court. Even where, as in this case,the claim underlying a c. 109A action touches on the health or welfare of housing occupants, such actions involve issues outside the court's expertise and legislative mandate.
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Would you like assistance with any other sections or specific legal arguments?

Yes, it is appropriate to state the "Jurisdictional Challenge" in the Case History section rather than the Introduction. The Case History section is meant to provide a chronological overview of the procedural aspects of the case, including jurisdictional issues that have arisen. Here's how you can frame it:
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