Unlawful Juvenile Prosecution

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JAMES ROBERT TICE, : Plaintiff : No. *:*-CV-* : v. : Judge Bissoon : HARRY E. WILSON, et al., : Defendants : JURY TRIAL OF *[*]* PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE *(b)(*) I. INTRODUCTION This brief responds to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure *(b)(*). Plaintiff, James Robert Tice, argues that his claims are well ple aded, and provide specific factual allegations to support his legal theories. These being facts that occurred, creating proper fact based legal theories (new) are firmly grounded in established case law, relevant statutes, and the United States Constitution. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW As per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure *(b)(*), the court must accept the complaint's allega tions as true, and determine, if they plausibly suggest entitlement to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, * U.S. *, * (*). The complaint need not be an extensive factual narrative, but, it must offer enough facts, to raise a claim above mere speculation. Estelle v. Gamble, * U. S. *, * (*). The court should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Moreso, every fact has been recited, all true, multiple times since the complaint to all defendants, thus far. As Defendants stated it {spans the entire life of Plaintiff}, to which, plaintiff states he is correct, and incorrect, as it is not plaintiffs life he wanted, it was because he was a {stolen child} to begin with, and reflected as true fact by the court orders themselves, that it is incomprehensibl e. The facts speak for themselves, the evidence speaks for itself, and the truth has been stated ov er the same course of his entire life, and supports itself. III. STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff was wrongfully convicted in *,*, *, *-*, *, and *, and *, and *, of several charges, including attempted rape, indecent assault, and corruption of mino rs. His convictions at * of *, were later challenged, and partially overturned due to ineff ective assistance of counsel, and [new evidence] showing he was not there, * was the same exact case, and charges causing a double ****eopardy, and lacking ****urisdiction. Plaintiff, who posses ses documented learning disabilities, and ADHD was a ****uvenile by the court, and a ****uvenile prior to that, thus given a new indefinite sentence, specifically for the adult charges negating ****uvenile, and forcing him into adult through multiple orders, both ****urisdictions separate, had illegal ****urisdi ction to do so, as to, all crimes ****uvenile, and adult, based on circumstances, mitigating factors, ****uvenile factors, and, asserts that these conditions, significantly impacted his understanding of legal proceedings, as the federal magistrate was well aware of. The ineffectiveness of his prior counsel, further compounded his inability to seek timely legal remedies in * Certiorari, inclu ding, until he filed in *, a COA, and Habeas [originally coram nobis great writ] in *, after hiring Federal counsel to do so, who took his funds, stated, he would represent him, and file a complaint if needed, to which, he did not, and [*] law professors said something was [fishy] with the case, left plaintiff suffering on his own, without hope,causing grave suffering medically, phy sically, mentally, and emotionally, thus leaving him in a state of again fighting for his freedom, while under draconian, barbaric, illegal to him, sentences that are punitive, and cannot apply leg ally, morally, ethically, or in any way possible causing slavery to continue under a roque system that does not apply, cannot apply to him. The government legally{albeit} illegally Kidnapped him originally, and held him to this day, abusing ,and accusing him without any protections afforded to him, stripping him of his life, liberty, and freedom, and any rights he would normally have, to which he has yet to live any form of life on his terms, and has not had any ability to do so under sentences in a continued form under different forms, is absolute slavery, cruel, and unus ual, and illegal, because it's blatantly unconstitutional to do so, and the courts, defendants, and strate actors have done so intentionally, knowingly, and intelligently to deprive him of such, whi le blocking him from retrieving any form of proper relief. IV. ARGUMENT A. Tolling of Statute of Limitations Defendants argue that, Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. However, the doctrine of equitable tolli ng, allows a court to [pause] the [statute of limitations] when [extraordinary-circumstances] “{hinder}” a plaintiff from pursuing legal remedies. Holland v. Florida, * U.S. *, * (* *). Here, Plaintiff presents such circumstances: *. Continuing Consequences of Wrongful Convictions: Plaintiff continues to suffer repercu ssions, including limitations on employment, housing, and social interaction. These are docum ented harms as established in studies on the impact of wrongful convictions on reintegration into society. *. Documented Disabilities: Plaintiff possesses documented learning disabilities, and ADHD, which can significantly impact a person's ability to understand complex legal issues, as recogn iz ed under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) – * U.S.C. § * et seq. *. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Plaintiff asserts his previous attorneys were ineffective. This claim, if proven, can further toll the statute of limitations. McQuiggan v. Perkins, * U.S. * (*); Muhammad v. Close, * U.S. * (*). We know this was true, since counsel was found ineffective, and new counsel after habeas counsel, including habeas counsel was ineff ective. B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Does Not Apply Defendants argue the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, bars this lawsuit, due to, prior state court procee dings. However, this doctrine only applies, when a federal lawsuit seeks to directly review, or rev erse state court decisions. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., * U.S. *, * (*). Plaintiff's claims focus on violations of his federal constitutional rights, including: Freedom of Speech, (First Amendment) Right to Bear Arms (Second Amendment) (Fourth Amendment) Ineffective assistance of counsel (Sixth Amendment) Double ****eopardy (Fifth Amendment) Due process (Fourteenth Amendment) Lack of ****urisdiction on the state court's part Abuse Constitutional violations All Others Stated These claims are independent federal questions not addressed by the state court, and are theref ore not barred by Rooker-Feldman, including the fact, that they automatically will call into que stion, and show the illegality of the state, rendering all orders illegal is secondary, and a by product of the violations automatically also, is [not barred]. Although they should be first,and foremost, not in a [corrupt system] or [Flawed System], how can they be. C. Plaintiff's Claims Have Merit *. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Plaintiff contends his prior attorneys were ineffective, faili ng to properly represent him and investigate his case. Such ineffectiveness violates his Sixth Am endment right to counsel. Strickland v. Washington, * U.S. * (*); Com. v. Grant, * Pa. * (*); Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, * F.3d * (3rd Cir. *). *. Lack of Jurisdiction: Plaintiff raises questions about the state court's ****urisdiction over his ca se due to improper procedures, and violations of ****uvenile law. If proven, these arguments could demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the underlying state court proceedings. D. Countering Defendant's Misconceptions *. Frivolous Claims: Defendants may argue Plaintiff's claims are frivolous or lack supporting evidence. However, the pleading stage requires a low bar. The well-pled factual allegations in the Complaint, coupled with relevant case law and constitutional references, satisfy the plausibility standard under Twombly. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule *(a)(*). *. State Court Deference: Defendants might argue the federal court should defer to the state cou rt's decisions. While federal courts generally respect state court rulings, this deference does not extend to situations, where a plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. See AEDP A, * U.S.C. § * (mechanism for federal review of state court convictions on constitution al gro unds). *. Statute of Limitations as Absolute Bar: Defendants claim the statute of limitations is an absolute bar. However, equitable tolling provides an exception when extraordinary circumstances exist. See Holland, supra. The documented disabilities, and ongoing consequences of the wrong ful convictions, present compelling arguments for equitable tolling. Additionally, the discovery rule is applicable in Pennsylvania, delaying the start of the limitations clock, until Plaintiff beca me [aware-of] the facts supporting his claims. See Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, * A.3d * (Pa. *). V. CONCLUSION Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be denied. Plaintiff's claims are timely due to equitable tol ling, and the potential application of the discovery rule, not barred by Rooker-Feldman, and sup ported by established legal principles, and the United States Constitution. Plaintiff deserves the opportunity to have his claims heard, and seek redress, for the immense train of brutal violations of his fundamental rights forced upon him. Respectfully Submitted, James Robert Tice Pro Se Plaintiff Attorney for Plaintiff this is legally correct for western district to support plaintiff? the law is correct, updated, proper.

does plaintiffs brief defeat the defendants brief:BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND NOW, come the Defendants, Department of Children & Youth CYS, Robert Blakely, District Attorney Kathleen Ann Scibetta, Jim K. Vogel, and the Erie County Prison, by and through their counsel, Marshall Dennehey, P.C., Patrick M. Carey, Esquire, and Emily C. Downing, Esquire, and submit the following Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, averring as follows: IL PROCEDURAL HISTORY In *, James R. Tice ( “Plaintiff’), was charged by the Erie City Police Department with two sets of criminal charges concerning his alleged sexual abuse of his niece. See Exhibits A and B. Plaintiff was convicted by a ****ury at both dockets of all criminal charges, including attempted rape, indecent assault, and corruption of minors. /d. On November *, *, Plaintiff was sentenced to a cumulative sentence of seven to fourteen (*-*) years of incarceration, followed by two years of probation. Jd. On March *, *, Plaintiff's conviction at Docket No. *-* was overturned and his sentence was vacated after his Writ of Habeas Corpus was granted, pursuant to the Court’s finding that his trial counsel was ineffective. He was released from custody in *. Jd. Case *:*-cv-*-CB Document * Filed */*/* Page * of * Plaintiff commenced this civil action, over nineteen years later, by filing a * page, pro se Complaint on February *, *. ECF No. *. Plaintiff's Complaint names forty-three (*) defendants, including the Department of Children & Youth CYS (“Erie County Children and Youth”), Robert Blakely, District Attorney Kathleen Ann Scibetta (“Kathleen Scibetta, Esq.”), and Jim K. Vogel (“James Vogel, Esq.”), or collectively, the Erie County Defendants. Il. STATEMENT OF FACTS Rather than focusing on alleged constitutional violations stemming solely from his criminal prosecution, the factual allegations contained within Plaintiff's Complaint appear to span the course of nearly his entire life, as he describes his involvement with the Erie County Children and Youth as a child and continues into present day, describing himself as a “shadow- prisoner”. See generally, ECF No. *. The claims raised against the County Defendant largely relate to his criminal prosecution. /d. However, they are incomprehensible, leaving the County Defendants unable to respond to the nonsensical claims including “Rico Act Violations,” “Forcing a false confession for a ****udge for clout,” “violation of USERA governing military rights,” “triple-****eopardy,” and “octa-****eopardy.” Jd. Although unclear, it appears that Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of dismissal of his criminal conviction at Docket *-* and compensation for his allegedly unlawful incarceration. Jd. Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure *(b)(*) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, * F.3d *, * (3d. Cir. *). When ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a ****udge must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Wayne Land & Case *:*-cv-*-CB Document * Filed */*/* Page * of * Mineral Grp. LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm’n, * F.3d *, *-* (3d. Cir. *). In order to survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, * US. *, * (*) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, * U.S. *, * (*)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient to establish plausible allegations. Jd., at * (citing Twombly, * U.S. at *). Plausibility means “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Jd., at'}*, * (citing Twombly, * U.S. at *, *). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d., (citing Twombly, * U.S. at *). Pursuant to Twombly and Iqbal, a District Court should the following three-step approach when ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss: First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’ Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’ Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., * F.3d *, * (3d. Cir. *)). This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its own ****udicial experience and common sense.” Jgbal, * U.S. at *. Applying the standard from Twombly and Jqbal, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be granted in full. See e.g. Capetillo v. Prime Care Medical Inc., * WL * Case *:*-cv-*-CB Document * Filed */*/* Page * of * (E.D. Pa. *); Schlaybach v. Berks Heim Nursing & Rehabilitation, * F. Supp. 3d * (E.D. Pa. *); Warren v. Prime Care Medical Inc., * WL * (E.D. Pa. *). It is well settled that: "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a Complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Federal Civil Procedure *(a)(*), and that each averment be 'concise, and direct,' Federal Civil Procedure *(e)(*)." Scibelli v. Lebanon County, * F.Appx. *, * (*" Cir. *). IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS A. §* Actions Claims brought pursuant to * U.S.C. §* “impose civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *). “It is well settled that §* does not confer any substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *)(quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *)). To establish a claim under §*, a plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *). B. Plaintiff's Complaint Should Be Dismissed Pursuant to Rule * Federal Rule of Civil Procedure * requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. *(a)(*); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, * U.S. *,* (*). While Plaintiff is afforded leniency in his filings as a pro se litigant, he is not exempt from satisfying basic pleading requirements. Haines, Case *:*-cv-*-CB Document * Filed */*/* Page * of * * U.S. at *. Rule *(e) further provides that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. *(e)(*). “Taken together, Rules *(a) and *(e)(*) underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules.” * Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice, and Procedure § * at * (2d ed. *). If the Complaint is “illegible or incomprehensible,” Scibelli v. Lebanon Cnty., * F. App’x *, * (3d Cir. *), “it is not only of an unwieldly length, but it is also largely unintelligible,” Stephanatos v. Cohen, * F. App’x *, * (3d Cir. *), or “is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised,” Tillio v. Spiess, * F. App’x *, * (3d Cir. *) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, * F.3d *, * (2d Cir. *)), it is necessary to dismiss the complaint for violating Rule *. See Mincy v. Klem, * F. App’x * (3d Cir. *); Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Ct., * F. App’x * (3d Cir. *); Bennet-Nelson v. Louisiana Bd. Of Regents, * F.3d *, * n.* (Sth Cir. *). “Rule *(a) requires parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so that ****udges and adverse parties need not try to fish a cold coin from a bucket of a mind.” U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., * F.3d *, * (7th Cir. *). Similarly, dismissal is warranted under Rule * when a complaint leaves the “defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constitute[s]’” a cause of action, Binsack v. Lackawanna Cnty. Prison, * F. App’x *, * (3d. Cir. *), or when the complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to avoid permitting defendants to present an appropriate response. Tillio, * F. App’x *. Plaintiff's Complaint is the very type of complaint Rule * guards against. Plaintiff's * page complaint is unwieldly in length and largely incomprehensible. The Erie County Defendants are unable to provide a meaningful response to Plaintiff's claims, as they are a Case *:*-cv-*-CB Document * Filed */*/* Page * of * collection of nonsensical and improperly used legal words. Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed, as it does not meet basic pleading requirements and clearly violates Rule *. Cc. Plaintiff’s Claims are Barred by the Statue of Limitations The statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § * is governed by the statute of limitations for tort claims in the state in which the claim was brought, which in Pennsylvania is two years. Kach v. Hose, * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *); Petsinger v. Department of Labor and Industry, Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, * A.2d *, * (Pa. Cmwilth. *); * Pa.C.S. § *. The cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the in****ury on which the action is based; that is, when the in****ury and its cause can reasonably be discovered. This is usually the date of the last action necessary to complete the tort. Kach, * F.3d at *-*; Boyd v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, * WL * at ** (Pa. Cmwlth. *) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, * U.S. *, *-* (*); Pennock vy. Lenzi, * A.2d *, * (Pa. Cmwilth. *)); Saxberg v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, * WL * at ** (Pa. Cmwlth. *) (citing Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, * A.3d *, * (Pa. *)); Sloan v. Coleman, * WL * at ** (Pa. Cmwlth. *) (citing Wilson, supra; * Pa. C.S. §*). Plaintiff failed to timely file his Complaint and therefore his claims are barred. Plaintiff's criminal conviction occurred in *. He was incarcerated through *, when his conviction at Docket No. *-* was overturned and his sentence was vacated. His conviction at Docket No. *-* was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in *. See Tice v. Wilson, * F. Supp. 2d * (W.D. Pa. *), aff'd, * F.App’x * (3d Cir. *). Therefore, Plaintiff's Complaint, at the very latest, had to have been filed by *. Considering Plaintiff's Case *:*-cv-*-CB Document * Filed */*/* Page * of * Complaint was filed nearly fifteen years late, his claims are barred by the statute of limitations and must be dismissed, with pre****udice. D. Defendants Scibetta and Vogel are Entitled to Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity As a general matter, a prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from damages under §* based on activities that are intimately associated with the ****udicial phase of the criminal process such as initiating a prosecution and presenting the state's case. Yarris v. County of Delaware, * F.3d * (*" Cir. *); Imbler v. Pachtman, * U.S. *, * S.Ct. *, * L.Ed. 2d * (*). This immunity extends to the decision of whether or not to prosecute. Davis v. Rendell, * F.2d * (* Cir. *). Prosecutors also en****oy immunity from investigatory acts taken to the extent that the securing of information is necessary to a prosecutor's decision to initiate a criminal prosecution. Thomas v. Rendell, * U.S. Dist. LEXIS * (E.D. Pa. *) (quoting Forsyth v. Kleindienst, * F.2d * (* Cir. *). A prosecutor's alleged failure to properly investigate before initiating a prosecution is also conduct within the scope of absolute immunity. Schrob v. Catterson, * F.2d * (* Cir. *). It is firmly established that prosecutors are “immune from damages claims arising from their official acts.” Naran****o v. City of Phila., * F. App’x. *, * (3d Cir. *)(citing Imbler v. Pachtman, * U.S. *, * — * (*)). This immunity “extends to acts that are intimately associated with the ****udicial phase of the criminal process” so as to allow a prosecutor to work without being constrained by the “consequences in terms of his [or her] potential liability in a suit for damages.” Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *) (citing Imbler, * U.S. * — *). In Yarris, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals set forth as follows: It is well settled that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from claims based on their failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, so long as they did so while functioning in their prosecutorial capacity. As the Supreme Court explained in /mbler, * Case *:*-cv-*-CB Document * Filed */*/* Page * of * the “deliberate withholding of ‘exculpatory information’ is included within the ‘legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” * U.S. at *-* n. *, * S.Ct. *; See also Smith v. Holtz, * F.3d *, * n. * (3d Cir. *). Furthermore, courts have held that prosecutors are entitled to immunity even when they withhold evidence after trial while the criminal conviction is on appeal. See e.g. Parkinson v. Cozzolino, * F.3d *, * (3d. Cir. *)(explaining that “absolute immunity covers prosecutors’ actions after the date of conviction while a direct appeal is pending”). * F.3d at *. The Supreme Court has viewed absolute immunity as "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, * U.S. *, * (*). Thus, absolute immunity defeats a lawsuit at the outset. Jmbler v. Pachtman, * U.S. *, * at n.* (*). See also, Siegert v. Gilley, * U.S. *, *, (*) ("One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit"); Jn re Montgomery County, * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *) ("absolute immunity creates not only protection from liability, but also a right not to stand trial"), cert. denied, * U.S. * (*); Boyd y. Biggers, * F.3d *, * (5th Cir. *) ("the [Supreme] Court has described immunity as a threshold question, to be resolved as early in the proceeding as possible"). To the extent that any claims of constitutional violations related to Plaintiff's criminal prosecution can be derived from a reading of his Complaint, Defendants Scibetta and Vogel are shielded from liability due to prosecutorial immunity. Therefore, Defendants Scibetta and Vogel, are entitled to dismissal of any claims related to the prosecution of Plaintiff's criminal cases. E. The Erie County Prison and Erie County Office of Children and Youth are not “Persons” for Purposes of a Civil Rights Claim It is well established that a defendant can only be liable under §* if he can fairly be considered a "state actor" with respect to the conduct at issue. To the extent that Plaintiff has * Case *:*-cv-*-CB Document * Filed */*/* Page * of * raised a claim against the "Erie County Prison," and “The Erie County Office of Children and Youth” they are not entities that are proper parties for §* litigation. Beaver v. Union County Pennsylvania, * Fed App’x *, * (3d Cir. *). Accordingly, it is clear that the Erie County Prison and the Office of Children and Youth are not a proper person for civil litigation purposes and must be dismissed. F. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Monell Claim In Monell v. Department of Social Services, * U.S. * (*), the Supreme Court of the United States established that municipalities and other local governmental units are included among those “persons” sub****ect to liability under §*. Jd. at *. It is firmly established that for purposes of §*, municipalities and other local governmental entities or officials may not be held liable under federal civil rights law for the acts of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Jgbal, * U.S. * (*); See also Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., * F.2d *, * (3d Cir. *). However, municipalities and other local governmental entities or officials may be held liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly said to represent official policy, inflicts the in****ury that the government as an entity is responsible under §*.” Monell, * U.S. at *. To sustain a Monell municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must first “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff's in****ury.” Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, * U.S. *, * (*); See also McTernan vy. City of York, Pa., * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *). Second, a Plaintiff must allege a “direct causal link between a [local government] policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *)(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, Case *:*-cv-*-CB Document * Filed */*/* Page * of * * U.S. *, * (*). Otherwise stated, the “policy or custom” of the Defendants must be the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. Berg v. County of Allegheny, * F.3d * (3d Cir. *). Where “the policy or custom does not facially violate federal law, causation can be established only by demonstrating that the municipal action was taken with deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious consequences. A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.” Jd. at * (citing Brown, * U.S. at *); See also Warren v. Prime Care Medical Inc., * WL *, ** (E.D. Pa. *) (“When a policy itself is not unconstitutional, ‘rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied.””)(citing Brown, * U.S. at *). "Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker. Otherwise, the existence of the unconstitutional policy, and its origin, must be separately proved." Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, * U.S. *, *-*, * S.Ct. * (*). "To infer the existence of a city policy from the isolated misconduct of a single, low-level officer, and then to hold the city liable on the basis of that policy, would amount to permitting precisely the theory of strict respondeat superior liability re****ected in Monell." Id., at *. In the case at bar, failed to establish any, specific policy, practice or custom of Erie County that was unconstitutional or that violated his rights. Based upon the legal authority cited above, the County Defendants are entitled to the dismissal of Plaintiffs alleged Monell claim, with pre****udice. * Case *:*-cv-*-CB Document * Filed */*/* Page * of * G. Plaintiff's Claims Related to Docket *-* Are Barred by the Rooker- Feldman Doctrine Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, a Federal District Court lacks the sub****ect matter ****urisdiction to review state court ad****udications or evaluate constitutional claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision. Guarino v. Larson, *, * (* Cir. *), citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, * U.S. *, * n.* (*) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, * U.S. *, * (*). A federal district court should not exercise ****urisdiction over constitutional claims that have been previously litigated in a state ****udicial proceeding or that are inextricably intertwined with a prior state ad****udication. Gulla v. North Strabane, * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *); FOCUS y. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, * F.3d *, *-* (3d Cir. *); accord District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, * U.S. *, * (*); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., * U.S. *, * (*). The Supreme Court in Fe/dman explained that, for the purposes of determining ****urisdiction, a ****udicial proceeding resulting in a state ad****udication occurs where the proceeding “‘investigate[s], declare[s], and enforce[s] liabilities ... on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.” Feldman., * U.S. at * quoted in Guarino, * F.3d *, * (declining ****urisdiction based upon Rooker-Feldman Doctrine). The Third Circuit held in Gulla that “if the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state decision or void its ruling,” the federal court should deny the claim on ****urisdictional grounds. Gulla., * F.3d at * quoting Charchenko y. City of Stillwater, * F.3d *, * n.* (* Cir. *). The Gulla court held that, under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, a federal district court could exercise ****urisdiction only if it could grant the relief requested without disturbing the state ad****udication. Jd. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine also “encompass[es] final decisions of lower state courts.” Jn re General Motors Corp. Products * Case *:*-cv-*-CB Document * Filed */*/* Page * of * Liability Litigation, * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *) (declining to exercise ****urisdiction under Rooker-Feldman Doctrine). Federal District Courts lack ****urisdiction once a state court has ad****udicated an issue because Congress has conferred only original ****urisdiction not appellate ****urisdiction on the District Courts. Rooker, * U.S. at *. Based upon the foregoing analysis, all claims raised by Plaintiff in his Complaint, related to Docket *-*, seeking to have that conviction overturned or dismissed, are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. H. Amendment to Plaintiff's Complaint Would Be Futile The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that a District Court must permit a curative amendment to a Complaint which is vulnerable to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure *(b)(*) "unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *). An amendment is deemed to be futile if the Amended Complaint cannot withstand a renewed Motion to Dismiss. Shane v. Fauver, * F.3d *, * (3d Cir. *). In the instant matter, amendment to Plaintiff's Complaint would be futile and therefore should not be not permitted.

can you redo the brief to defeat defendants further with proper law here, for plaintiffs brief

provide more Providing more case law to strengthen arguments around Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, showing the independent nature of your federal claims. and Citing more case law to support the argument that the statute of limitations is not an absolute bar in this scenario.

those are cited already

do you?

provide the case law updated taht would apply to western district of pa, and state citing fully each.

Of course! Looking at your brief, here are a few areas which could benefit from additional case law or legal principles: *. For the argument on learning disabilities and ADHD affecting the understanding of legal proceedings, you could reference cases where courts acknowledged these conditions impacting a defendant's ability to engage in legal processes. *. To support the ineffectiveness of counsel claim, adding case law where a court found counsel ineffective can be beneficial. *. To further challenge the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, you could provide additional case law where federal courts accepted claims not addressed by state courts.

as per the brief, what about the lack of ****ursidiction of ****uvenile, and adult, in the first place,, and original stolen child by the government state actors, and how does that prevent any charges in both ****urisdictions, thus apply here to the lawsuit and brief to support his lawsuit is timely.

referencethe cases

For the claim of being a "stolen child" by state actors: - Santosky v. Kramer, * U.S. * (*): The Supreme Court held that before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. how does this support plaintiff as a stolen child?

what else here can be used

yes

Continuing Consequences of Wrongful Convictions: Plaintiff continues to suffer repercu ssions, including limitations on employment, housing, and social interaction. These are docum ented harms as established in studies on the impact of wrongful convictions on reintegration into society.

so here petitioner was found actually innocent in * habeas corpus, as to one of two split dockets, lacking ****urisdiction to charge a ****uvenile tried as an adult without certification or waiver. The adult charges was derived after a ****uvenile denov trial sequestering his guilt, detaingin, and giving a sentence of indefinite period of time, to an already ****uvenile. Both cases was the same set of charges, and resulted in same set of duel sentences consecutive to each other, which was at one trial, using tainted dates from a fax tainted derived prior to replacement hearing in ****uvenile. this violates douuble ****eopardy, and due process.

yes, so this violates in re gault

so the split cases are illegal at one trial, and tainted evidence by a chief ****uvenile probation officer for adult purposes stating ps i think he did it, redacted, and for adult purposes, since turned *, on a fax retrieved prior to replacement hearing, against rehabilitation is illegal evidence siezed, and used for adult prosecution, without anycertification or wavier after he was continued by the court a ****uvenile *, with an indefinite sentence is illegal charging as an adult, thus lacking ****urisdiction do to stolen child, wrongful convictions, double ****eopardy in ****uvenile originally.

right so, without certification, or waiver, and being already continued a ****uvenile *, then released and closed, prior to charging, would be illegal in pa, and the united states.

so it would be illegal to charge split cases also using those tainted dates, to make duel cases of the exact same at one trial to gain two of the same sentences consecutively.'

how charging split cases using the same set of facts could potentially be seen as double ****eopardy, which is prohibited under the Fifth Amendment. Cases like "Blockburger v. United States, * U.S. * (*)" and "Brown v. Ohio, * U.S. * (*)

ght, so it weould be the same offense, including the same offense as ****uvenile because it was derived from the ****uvenile evidence, and the tainted evidence, was used for adult. Because both charged dockets are the same exact charges and the sentences was the exact same, including consecutive is double ****eopardy

so this means that the prosecution splitting two dockets because of different dates that was one in ****uvenile pending charges denovoed, stemming from the use of tainted fax with dates on it, is illegal, and should have been suppressed evidence.

so they did, so it is illegal on many fronts, and this makes the record actually in adult illegal on many fronts here.

the facts of your case align grounds to argue illegality, so the record would be illegal, and it would be further illegal for the prosecution to charge as an adult stemming off the ****uvenile case, using tainted ****uvenile evidence, not only without a certification hearing, or waiver, but after a ****uvenile thrown on the street stated to be an adult after detained, replacement hearing, denovo, sequestering guilt or innocence on the pending charges, an indefinite sentence, and continued a 18 year old ****uvenile, who was then placed in a state of limbo after ****urisdiction was closed, said to be an adult, charged with a burglary in limbo is illegal, and innocent of.

how would you argue that part

The record is illegal, and the illegality was challenged, is challenged, and is allowed to be challenged, including the civil lawsuit, because it is a clear continuing violation of punitive punishment in itself, causing others to continue.

it supports also and a ****uvenile charged again as an adult using the same evidence, that would be different charges in ****uvenile, as would be in adult.

so this would be correctly stated and supported legally The record is illegal, and the illegality was challenged, is challenged, and is allowed to be challenged, including the civil lawsuit, because it is a clear continuing violation of puniti ve punishment in itself, causing others to continue.Robinson v. California, * U.S. * (*): The Supreme Court ruled that laws inflicting cruel, and unusual punishment are i n violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.Solem v. Helm, * U.S. * (* *): The Supreme Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a non-violent crime was a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel, and unusual punishments, supports your argument against continuous punitive punishments, and a ****uvenile charged again as an adult using the same evidence, that wou ld be different charges in ****uvenile, as would be in adult. Miller v. Alabama, * U.S. * (*): The Supreme Court ruled that mandatory life sentences without parole are unconstitutional for ****uvenile offenders. - Graham v. Florida, * U.S. * (*): The Court held that ****uveniles cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for non -homicide offenses. But plaintiff was unfairly so, thus continuing, he in fact is still in the same limbo,regardless of prison sentences, and punitive sentences, stemming from the same limbo in *, because federal questions was never resolved, and have never been resolve d, regardless of being stated.

so the case law is stated correctly here

The record is illegal, and the illegality was challenged, is challenged, and is allowed to be challenged, including the civil lawsuit, because it is a clear continuing violation of puniti ve punishment in itself, causing others to continue.Robinson v. California, * U.S. * (*): The Supreme Court ruled that laws inflicting cruel, and unusual punishment are i n violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.Solem v. Helm, * U.S. * (* *): The Supreme Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a non-violent crime was a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel, and unusual punishments, supports your argument against continuous punitive punishments, and a ****uvenile charged again as an adult using the same evidence, that wou ld be different charges in ****uvenile, as would be in adult. Miller v. Alabama, * U.S. * (*): The Supreme Court ruled that mandatory life sentences without parole are unconstitutional for ****uvenile offenders. - Graham v. Florida, * U.S. * (*): The Court held that ****uveniles cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for non -homicide offenses. But plaintiff was unfairly so, thus continuing, he in fact is still in the same limbo, regardless of prison sentences, and punitive sentences, stemming from the same limbo in *, because federal questions was never resolved, and have never been resolved, regardless of being stated. Prohibition of cruel, and unusual punishment, and th e rights of ****uveniles in the criminal ****ustice system are important, legally reasoned so, thus apply to the plaintiff here, that was un****ustly denied. To clarify here, plaintiff states baxter may not have known about, all ****uvenile orders, and events in her assessment, but could have known, rather should have known, while plaintiff is unsure as to that point, she clearly denied him his rights, through mundane legal traps, trapping both him and his cou nsel under a two bytes doctrine, causing ineffective counsel, and thus, deprived plaintiff of his rights, while also finding him actually innocent, thus helping him, this was pre****ud icial, because it disallowed under habeas all of his issues, causing further know punish ments after the fact. While he praises her for finding him innocent, she had no choice, he proved his actual innocence in not being there, and has new evidence to prove further that backs that up, ie, school records, in-fact new evidence proves the second * case was fraudulent, no ****uror, or legitimate trier fact, not corrupt one, would convict. Showing that the victim was making up stories, along with her mother, direct witnesses catching her, testimony on tape, to a host of other evidence, and witnesses, such as evidence she sat on her grandfathers lap, and stated he never touched her, to her brothers molesting each other at the same time, to her brother, vindictively trying to rape other 14 year olds, meet them at a gas station, to entrapment again by the same victims mother akin to *, and * allegations after habeas relief, to the victims attempting to state, she had his confe ssions, when he lived in a basement of a sheriffs home, with no internet access, including evidence, originally of, witness’s taking him to work saturdays, and sundays, he was state d charged for, school records show, he was in school, and not tardy. This is all new evid ence ****ust for case * and * of *. The other evidence is new from * arson, and stolen child, including all cases, further * traffic offense in front of a corrupt ****udg e, and forced * over confession by state police, which gives him a right to sue, and file habeas corpus, and a COA, to which he did, after hiring counsel to do it loosing his fund s.

The record is illegal, and the illegality was challenged, is challenged, and is allowed to be challenged, including the civil lawsuit, because it is a clear continuing violation of puniti ve punishment in itself, causing others to continue.Robinson v. California, * U.S. * (*): The Supreme Court ruled that laws inflicting cruel, and unusual punishment are i n violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.Solem v. Helm, * U.S. * (* *): The Supreme Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a non-violent crime was a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel, and unusual punishments, supports your argument against continuous punitive punishments, and a ****uvenile charged again as an adult using the same evidence, that wou ld be different charges in ****uvenile, as would be in adult. Miller v. Alabama, * U.S. * (*): The Supreme Court ruled that mandatory life sentences without parole are unconstitutional for ****uvenile offenders. - Graham v. Florida, * U.S. * (*): The Court held that ****uveniles cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for non -homicide offenses. But plaintiff was unfairly so, thus continuing, he in fact is still in the same limbo, regardless of prison sentences, and punitive sentences, stemming from the same limbo in *, because federal questions was never resolved, and have never been resolved, regardless of being stated. Prohibition of cruel, and unusual punishment, and th e rights of ****uveniles in the criminal ****ustice system are important, legally reasoned so, thus apply to the plaintiff here, that was un****ustly denied. To clarify here, plaintiff states baxter may not have known about, all ****uvenile orders, and events in her assessment, but could have known, rather should have known, while plaintiff is unsure as to that point, she clearly denied him his rights, through mundane legal traps, trapping both him and his cou nsel under a two bytes doctrine, causing ineffective counsel, and thus, deprived plaintiff of his rights, while also finding him actually innocent, thus helping him, this was pre****ud icial, because it disallowed under habeas all of his issues, causing further know punish ments after the fact. While he praises her for finding him innocent, she had no choice, he proved his actual innocence in not being there, and has new evidence to prove further that backs that up, ie, school records, in-fact new evidence proves the second * case was fraudulent, no ****uror, or legitimate trier fact, not corrupt one, would convict. Showing that the victim was making up stories, along with her mother, direct witnesses catching her, testimony on tape, to a host of other evidence, and witnesses, such as evidence she sat on her grandfathers lap, and stated he never touched her, to her brothers molesting each other at the same time, to her brother, vindictively trying to rape other 14 year olds, meet them at a gas station, to entrapment again by the same victims mother akin to *, and * allegations after habeas relief, to the victims attempting to state, she had his confe ssions, when he lived in a basement of a sheriffs home, with no internet access, including evidence, originally of, witness’s taking him to work saturdays, and sundays, he was state d charged for, school records show, he was in school, and not tardy. This is all new evid ence ****ust for case * and * of *. The other evidence is new from * arson, and stolen child, including all cases, further * traffic offense in front of a corrupt ****udg e, and forced * over confession by state police, which gives him a right to sue, and file habeas corpus, and a COA, to which he did, after hiring counsel to do it loosing his fund s.

this then shows he is correct The record is illegal, and the illegality was challenged, is challenged, and is allowed to be challenged, including the civil lawsuit, because it is a clear continuing violation of puniti ve punishment in itself, causing others to continue.Robinson v. California, * U.S. * (*): The Supreme Court ruled that laws inflicting cruel, and unusual punishment are i n violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.Solem v. Helm, * U.S. * (* *): The Supreme Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a non-violent crime was a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel, and unusual punishments, supports your argument against continuous punitive punishments, and a ****uvenile charged again as an adult using the same evidence, that wou ld be different charges in ****uvenile, as would be in adult. Miller v. Alabama, * U.S. * (*): The Supreme Court ruled that mandatory life sentences without parole are unconstitutional for ****uvenile offenders. - Graham v. Florida, * U.S. * (*): The Court held that ****uveniles cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for non -homicide offenses. But plaintiff was unfairly so, thus continuing, he in fact is still in the same limbo, regardless of prison sentences, and punitive sentences, stemming from the same limbo in *, because federal questions was never resolved, and have never been resolved, regardless of being stated. Prohibition of cruel, and unusual punishment, and th e rights of ****uveniles in the criminal ****ustice system are important, legally reasoned so, thus apply to the plaintiff here, that was un****ustly denied. To clarify here, plaintiff states baxter may not have known about, all ****uvenile orders, and events in her assessment, but could have known, rather should have known, while plaintiff is unsure as to that point, she clearly denied him his rights, through mundane legal traps, trapping both him and his cou nsel under a two bytes doctrine, causing ineffective counsel, and thus, deprived plaintiff of his rights, while also finding him actually innocent, thus helping him, this was pre****ud icial, because it disallowed under habeas all of his issues, causing further know punish ments after the fact. While he praises her for finding him innocent, she had no choice, he proved his actual innocence in not being there, and has new evidence to prove further that backs that up, ie, school records, in-fact new evidence proves the second * case was fraudulent, no ****uror, or legitimate trier fact, not corrupt one, would convict. Showing that the victim was making up stories, along with her mother, direct witnesses catching her, testimony on tape, to a host of other evidence, and witnesses, such as evidence she sat on her grandfathers lap, and stated he never touched her, to her brothers molesting each other at the same time, to her brother, vindictively trying to rape other 14 year olds, meet them at a gas station, to entrapment again by the same victims mother akin to *, and * allegations after habeas relief, to the victims attempting to state, she had his confe ssions, when he lived in a basement of a sheriffs home, with no internet access, including evidence, originally of, witness’s taking him to work saturdays, and sundays, he was state d charged for, school records show, he was in school, and not tardy. This is all new evid ence ****ust for case * and * of *. The other evidence is new from * arson, and stolen child, including all cases, further * traffic offense in front of a corrupt ****udg e, and forced * over confession by state police, which gives him a right to sue, and file habeas corpus, and a COA, to which he did, after hiring counsel to do it loosing his fund s.